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CONFESSIONS AND THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN JAPAN
Daniel H. Foote*
In several highly-publicized recent cases in Japan, individuals con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death were acquitted in retrials
obtained after decades on death row.' These so-called "death penalty
retrial cases" generated great controversy and considerable reflection
about the criminal justice system in Japan. A central, substantive
issue presented by these cases relates to the procurement and use of
confessions; each of these cases-and several other major recent
Japanese cases in which defendants have been acquitted following
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. Visiting
Professor, University of Tokyo, Faculty of Law, 1991.
I thank the Japan-United States Educational Commission and Harvard University
for support through a GARIOA-Fulbright Alumni Award and Frederick H. Sheldon
Traveling Fellowship, respectively, during research on this article. I am grateful to
Professors Koya Matsuo, Kuniji Shibahara, Setsuo Miyazawa, J. Mark Ramseyer,
Arthur Rosett, and John Haley, and to Judges Yuzuru Takahashi and Takeo Setoguchi
for advice and helpful comments, and to the Supreme Court of Japan for providing
access to library facilities and research assistance. Finally, I owe special thanks to
Professor Masahito Inouye of the University of Tokyo and to Haruki Sugiyama of
the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office.
I Judgment of July 15, 1983, Chisai (District Court), 1090 Hanrei Jih5 [HANJI]
21 (Japan v. Menda, Kumamoto D. Ct.) (popularly known as the Menda case) (over
31 years between date death sentence became final and ultimate acquittal); Judgment
of March 12, 1984, Chisai (District Court), 1107 HANJI 13 (Japan v. Taniguchi,
Takamatsu D. Ct.) (popularly known as the Saitakawa case) (27 years); Judgment
and Rule of July 11, 1984, Chisai (District Court), 1316 HANi 21 (Japan v.
SaitU, Sendai D. Ct.) (popularly known as the Matsuyama case) (23 years); Judgment
of Jan. 31, 1989, Chisai (District Court), 1316 HANri 21 (Japan v. Akabori, Shizuoka
D. Ct.) (popularly known as the Shimada case). For commentary on these cases,
see, e.g., NIHON BENOOSm RENGoKAI-HEN [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS,
ED.), SAISHIN [RETRIALS] (1977); NIHON BENGOSHI RENG6KAI-HEN [JAPAN FEDERATION
OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, ED.], ZOKu-SAIsmN [RETRIALS, CONTINUED] (1986) [hereinafter
ZOKU-SAIsmN]; HorlAKu SEMINA ZoKAN, NIHoN NO ENZAI [Hogaku Seminar Extra
Number, False Accusations in Japan] (1983) [hereinafter NIHON NO ENZAI].
As the references to the popular names of the cases reveal, in Japan it is rare to
refer to a case by the names of the parties, in part due to concern over potential
stigma. Citations normally include only the court, date, and reporter page number;
but major cases often become known by a popular name, which may come from
the place of the crime or even from a concise description of the crime itself (e.g.,
the "Case of the Murder of the Wife of a Hirosaki University Professor"). Following
U.S. style, in citing to cases I have included the names of the parties where available.
For some cases that did not appear in official public reports but rather were published
only in private case reporters, the names of the parties did not appear.
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bitterly contested trials-turned on the validity of repudiated con-
fessions.
Consequently, much recent commentary has focussed on confes-
sions and related issues. Not surprisingly, the battle lines generally
reflect the professions of the authors, with prosecutors often arguing
that these cases reveal the need to interrogate suspects more thor-
oughly and to obtain even fuller confessions, while defense attorneys
and many academics contend that further restrictions should be placed
on the procurement and use of confessions. This controversy, in turn,
is part of a much broader debate over the right to silence and the
role of confessions in Japan, a topic with deep historical roots.
That broader debate finds close parallels in the debate over Miranda
v. Arizona2 in the United States. For the moment, the continued
validity of Miranda itself seems secure,' although that opinion has
come under considerable attack in recent years4 and the Supreme
Court recently indicated a willingness to reexamine other longstanding
principles of the law on confessions.' Among the commentaries critical
of Miranda is a report on pre-trial interrogation prepared by the
Office of Legal Policy of the Department of Justice at the direction
of then-Attorney General Edwin Meese. 6 In advocating that Miranda
be overruled, the report noted the existence of less stringent restric-
tions on questioning of suspects in a number of foreign countries.7
Although the report did not do so, it might well have relied heavily
on the example of Japan. After all, the right to silence is enshrined
in both the Constitution8 and Code of Criminal Procedure9 in Japan,
in terms that are in some respects strikingly similar to standards set
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990); N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1990,
at Al, col. 3 (reporting on Supreme Court confirmation hearings of David H.
Souter).
4 See, e.g., Dripps, Against Police Interrogation - And the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRNm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 700 (1988); Caplan, Ques-
tioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417 (1985).
1 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (overruling large body of
precedent in holding that harmless error analysis applies to coerced confessions, with
four Justices concluding that the confession in question was not involuntary).
6 Report to the Attorney General on the Law of Pre-trial Interrogation, Truth
in Criminal Justice Report No. 1, Feb. 12, 1986 [hereinafter Report to the Attorney
General].
Id. at 84-93.
KENP5 [Constitution] (Japan) [hereinafter Constitution or KENP6].
9 Keiji Soshoho (Code of Criminal Procedure), Law No. 131 of 1948 [hereinafter
Code or KEisoH5].
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forth in Miranda itself. Despite those constitutional and statutory
provisions, Japanese police and prosecutors possess very broad tools
for obtaining confessions. Moreover, according to such measures as
crime rates and clearance rates, Japan's criminal justice system ranks
as one of the best in the world,' 0 and Japanese prosecutors enjoy a
conviction rate of 99.9076." What more could Ed Meese have wanted?
On the other side of the spectrum, the Japan Civil Liberties Union 2
and many others 3 contend that the current system of pretrial inter-
rogation in Japan results in widespread invasion of human rights.
As an examination of existing standards and practices will reveal,
from an American perspective the current scheme appears to present
an array of human rights concerns. It is important to consider those
standards and practices not just from an American perspective but
in the context of both historical attitudes toward confessions and
authority in Japan and Japan's overall criminal justice system. The
fundamental differences in history, attitudes and systems render the
approach to the right to silence much more understandable and
reasonable (although by no means entirely free of concerns and
dangers) within the Japanese setting, yet raise grave doubts about
Japan's suitability as a model for the United States in this regard.
,o See, e.g., HGMUSH6, Hsu Sc5 KENKYUSHO, HANzAI HAKUSHO (HEISEI 2-
NEN-BAN) [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE, WHITE PAPER
ON CRIME] 24-29 (1990 ed.). Critics have questioned the accuracy of the statistics
on clearance rates, noting that police may inflate their records by declining to include
reports of crimes that have gone uncleared, among other possible deficiencies. See,
e.g., Miyazawa, Keiji seido o saji de meiru me [Looking at the Criminal Justice
System Through Numbers], 427 HOGAKU SEMIN , 32, 37 (1990). Underreporting is
by no means limited to Japan, however, and it seems safe to say that in relative
terms Japanese police maintain an impressive clearance rate.
11 See HmUSH6, HOMu SOGO KENKYUSHO, HANzAi HAKUsHO (HEISEI GANNEN-
BAN) [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE, WHITE PAPER ON
CRIME] 402, 578, 614-15 (1989 ed.) (statistics for selected years from 1926 through
1987); Miyazawa, supra note 10, at 47 (conviction rate of 99.91% in 1988).
12 See Itoh, On Publication of the "Citizens' Human Rights Reports", 20 LAW
IN JAPAN 29, 54-63 (1987).
" See, e.g., Igarashi, Forced to Confess, in DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN
195 (G. McCormack and Y. Sugimoto eds. 1986); JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE THREE
TOKYO BAR ASSOCIATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF THE DArYO-KANGOKU (SUBSTITUTE
PRISON) SYSTEM, TORTURE AND UNLAWFUL OR UNJUST TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN
DAJYO-KANGOKU (SUBSTITUTE PRISONS) IN JAPAN (1989) [hereinafter JOINT COMMIT-
TEE]; 2 NIHON BENGOSHI RENGKAI-HEN (Japan Federation of Bar Associations,
ed.), SOSA To JN14KEN [INVESTIGATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 70-73 (1975) [hereinafter
SUSA To JINKEN]; T. Maezaka, ENKAJ To GoHAN [FALSE ACCUSATIONS AND MISTAKEN
JUDGMENTS] 69-99 (1982).
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I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CONFESSIONS IN JAPAN' 4
A. Tokugawa Era
It is frequently asserted that, with the possible exception of a short-
lived adoption of Chinese criminal codes in the eighth century, 1"
confessions of the accused were regarded as a crucial element of
prosecutions in Japan until 1876.16 This assertion is true to a certain
extent, but not entirely.
In principle, during the Tokugawa era (1600-1868) the formal writ-
ten confession of the accused was required for conviction and pun-
ishment.' 7 In most cases, investigative officials drafted a formal
confession statement in a prescribed form and the suspect then affixed
a seal to that document. The formal confession statement has been
described as "a short, stereotyped, largely abstract, reconstructed
account, crafted in a legal manner to correspond to the necessary
elements for a particular crime under the substantive criminal law.'"'
Punishment was assessed in a separate proceeding, but the punish-
ments for specific crimes were fixed quite precisely by the Osada-
megaki (a compilation of prior decrees and precedents promulgated
by the Shogun Yoshimune in 1742)' 9 and other materials and pre-
cedents. The facts of the crime as set forth in the formal confession
almost completely determined the level of punishment to be assessed.
As a consequence, the investigative officials in effect played the
key role in deciding sentences. In theory, those officials were only
" See generally C. JOHNSON, CONSPIRACY AT MATSUKAWA 149-66 (1972); Abe,
Self-Incrimination - Japan and the United States, 46 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOL. AND
POLICE Sc. 613 (1956) [hereinafter Abe, Self-Incrimination]; Abe, The Privilege
Against Self Incrimination Under Foreign Law: Japan, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOL.
AND POLICE SC. 178 (1960) [hereinafter Abe, Privilege]; George, The "Right of
Silence" in Japanese Law, 43 WASH. L. REV. 1147 (1968).
,1 Those codes, as adopted in Japan in the Taiho and Yoro codes, allowed
judgments based on either confessions of the defendant or the testimony of witnesses.
S. DANDo, JAPANESE CRIUNAL PROCEDURE 12-13 (B. George, trans., 1965). The
fact that they allowed the use of torture to extract confessions, though, suggests
that the emphasis even under those codes may have been on confessions as a method
of proof.
16 See Gadsby, Some Notes on the History of the Japanese Code of Criminal
Procedure, 30 L. Q. REV. 448, 449 (1914).
'7 See Y. HIRAMATSU, KINsEI KEmr SOSHUH5 No KENKYY [A STUDY OF THE LAW
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE RECENT ERA] 762-63 (1960).
" Id. at 806.
'9 See, e.g., D. HENDERSON, I CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW, TOKUGAWA AND
MODERN 7 n.26 (1965).
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supposed to determine the facts, and the confession statements did
not contain conclusions about what crime had been committed or
the appropriate punishment. In practice, however, the confessions
were crafted with an eye toward the Osadamegaki and precedents.
Numerous reports exist of cases in which the investigators deliberately
altered the facts in a manner advantageous to the suspect (and some-
times were even encouraged to do so). In some cases this was done
to avoid the shame of recognizing that a certain crime (such as
adultery) had been committed and in others to avoid the imposition
of a punishment regarded as unduly harsh. 20 In this connection, one
famous type of falsification was the practice of writing that the
amount of a theft was "9 rya, 3 bu and 2 shu" (the equivalent of
9.875 ryo, a monetary measure in use at that time), since the death
penalty was required for thefts of over 10 ryo.21 The possibility that
the facts could be altered in a disadvantageous manner also existed,
provided that the suspect assented to the confession statement.
As in many other nations, torture was a recognized method for
extracting confessions. Methods of torture were highly standardized.
These commenced with the so-called "stone holding" torture, in which
up to five or six stones, weighing approximately 100 pounds each,
were successively placed onto the suspect's lap. 22 The most severe
level of torture was the gomon, conducted in a special torture cell.
23
(The most common category of gamon was the tsurizeme, which
consisted of being bound with one's arms behind one's back and
then hung by the hands). The various tortures were alternated, with
suspects sometimes undergoing as many as 30 or 40 torture sessions. 24
Subject to one exception, a person who refused to confess could
not be convicted without undergoing torture. 25 If solid evidence of
guilt existed, but the suspect refused to confess despite undergoing
torture, the suspect could nonetheless be convicted based on this other
evidence. Nevertheless, this exceptional type of case required the
20 See M. TAKIGAWA, NIXON GYOKEISHI [PENAL HISTORY OF JAPAN] 92-93 (1964);
HIRAMATSU, supra note 17, at 834.
21 Id.
22 See Abe, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 613-15.
23 See id. at 614 n.5.
24 HIRAMATSU, supra note 17, at 792-93; R. ISHI, EDO No KEIBATSU [PUNISHMENTS
IN THE EDO BRA] 24-25 (1964).
25 See HIRAMATSU, supra note 17, at 831; but see Y. FUTAGAWA, G6MON [TORTURE]
67 (1957) (citing a case where the suspect was convicted without a confession and
apparently without undergoing torture).
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suspect to acknowledge the finding of guilt. This was done by sealing
a document (the satsudo) acknowledging that the authorities, follow-
ing a careful examination, had found that the suspect committed the
crime in question. 26 In such a case, the suspect's punishment was to
be reduced by one degree. 27 Suspects who themselves confessed and
also reported others for more serious crimes were also entitled to a
one-degree reduction in punishment. 21
This emphasis on confessions originated in Chinese practice. Many
of the particulars are virtually identical to practices under traditional
Chinese law. 29 These practices include the specific types of tortures
prescribed, although many more types of torture were permitted in
China than in Japan,30 as well as the practice of granting leniency
to those who confessed their crimes voluntarily, especially for property
crimes and the like that could be repaired by restitution or compen-
sation.3 In traditional China, the voluntary confession apparently
was viewed as "an instrument by which the harmonious balance in
human and cosmic relations should be restored[;] ... an offense
which could be cancelled out by repentance and restitution required
no punishment. 3 2 More recently, confessions have continued to play
a major role in the criminal justice system of the People's Republic
of China. The emphasis, however, has shifted, with confessions con-
sciously regarded as a tool for encouraging cooperation with au-
thorities and establishing political control.33
In Japan, the role of confessions has evolved as well. Several
reasons have been suggested for the emphasis on confessions in
Tokugawa Japan. These reasons bear some similarities, but also
represent marked differences from those of traditional China. In
Japan, one important reason for the emphasis on confessions was
16 HIRAMATSU, supra note 17, at 829-30.
11 Id. at 830. In many cases, such a reduction could mean the difference between
the death penalty and banishment. The reduction reportedly was performed on a
case-by-case basis, however, and was not guaranteed.
I1 d. at 616.
19 See Rickett, Voluntary Surrender and Confession in Chinese Law: The Problem
of Continuity, 30 J. ASIAN STUD. 797 (1971).
30 See D. BODDE AND C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 97-98 (1967).
11 See Rickett, supra note 29, at 798-799. In this regard, the principles followed
in Tokugawa Japan may have differed from those in traditional China, for in Japan
the reduction in punishment for a person who turned himself or herself in does not
seem to have been limited in this manner. See HIRAMATSU, supra note 17, at 616.
32 Rickett, supra note 29, at 813.
3 Id. at 813-14.
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proof; the confession was apparently regarded as the most reliable
evidence of the truth and was also regarded as the quickest and easiest
method of discovering accomplices and pursuing other crimes. In
addition, the confession and the alternative of acknowledgment of
guilt through the satsudo process were viewed as having great im-
portance as an acceptance and recognition of the authority of the
Shogunate's criminal justice system .34
It is less clear whether confessions were regarded at that time as
also playing a role in the rehabilitation process, i.e., as a means of
achieving moral catharsis of the suspect. On its face, the aforemen-
tioned reduction in punishment for suspects who refused to confess
might be seen as rewarding the suspect who was able to hold out.
Thus, the reductions had quite the opposite effect of encouragement
of confession as a step toward rehabilitation. Furthermore, punish-
ments were in principle fixed on the basis of the facts of the crime,
with reference to the personal characteristics and background of the
suspect only in limited circumstances." Additionally, the rehabilitative
function is not commonly referred to in writings about the role of
confessions in Tokugawa Japan.
The reduction in sentence for those convicted without a confession,
though, is most likely an indication that the authorities were not
fully convinced of guilt but felt that punishment was warranted in
any event. As Yoshiro Hiramatsu, a leading Japanese legal historian,
noted, this reduction appears to have been a somewhat questionable
operation of the principle "in dubio pro reo.''36 Moreover, certain
evidence suggests at least some rehabilitative function for confessions
at that time. In the view of one of Japan's leading legal historians,
the criminal justice system in the first half of the Tokugawa era
(from 1600 through roughly the time of promulgation of the Osa-
damegaki in 1742) was dominated by principles of general deterrence;
emphasis was placed on firm enforcement of fixed penalties as an
example for others.3 7 By the latter half of the Tokugawa period,
however, numerous aspects of specific deterrence (and efforts to
promote rehabilitation) developed in the criminal justice system, in-
cluding the practice of granting pardons (sha) both to suspects prior
3, HRAMATSU, supra note 17, at 831.
35 Isim, supra note 24, at 91, describes the enhanced penalty for repeated thefts
as one such of the primary such exceptions; the death penalty was mandated for a
third theft conviction.
36 Hr11MATSU, supra note 17, at 831-32.
31 IsHi, supra note 24, at 11-12.
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to conviction and to previously convicted individuals.38 At that time,
the primary purpose of these pardons was to encourage reform;
remorse was a vital element for obtaining a pardon. 39 Accordingly,
it seems safe to assume that the sincerity of the confession played a
significant role in determining whether such pardons would be granted.
Yet it remains unclear whether the confession process was consciously
regarded as a tool used to bring about remorse and rehabilitation or
simply as evidence of such remorse.
B. Meiji Era through World War H
After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, two of the features of Japanese
law previously mentioned-confessions as an essential element of
proof and standardized methods of torture-were embodied in the
formal legal codes. Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (kaitei
ritsurei) of 1873 stated that "all crimes shall be adjudicated on the
basis of confessions," and the Rules of Criminal Procedure (dangoku
sokurei), adopted in that same year, specified certain methods of
torture 0 Yet following criticism by Professor Gustave Emile Bois-
sonade, a French law professor invited by the government of Japan
to help codify and modernize Japanese law, and others, these pro-
visions soon were revised. In 1876, Article 318 was amended to
indicate that "all crimes shall be adjudicated on the basis of evi-
dence," and an 1879 Cabinet Order specified the abolition of torture.4 1
In theory, the Chizaiho (Criminal Procedure Code) of 188042 and
the Criminal Procedure Codes of 189043 and 192244 further ensured
the principle of trial on the basis of evidence and established limits
on self-incrimination. While the Chizaiha and the 1890 Code were
based on French law and the 1922 Code on German law, the basic
framework of investigation was similar. The framework consisted of
three stages: first, the police and prosecutors conducted an initial
investigation prior to the charge; second, a so-called "preliminary
judge" (yoshin hanji) conducted a thorough-and secret-investi-
gation of the entire case to determine whether the accusation was
18 Id. at 12-17.
39 Id. at 14-15, 93; Takayanagi, Tokugawa bakufu no sharitsu ni tsuite [Regarding
the Code on Pardons of the Tokugawa Shogunate], 12 HoGAKU Nos. 9, 10 (1943).
,0 See Abe, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 615.
41 See id.; DANro, supra note 15, at 14; Gadsby, supra note 16, at 452.
42 Decree No. 37 of 1880.
43 Law No. 96 of 1890.
44 Law No. 75 of 1922.
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warranted; and finally, a trial court conducted a public trial. 45 The
police and prosecutors had the discretionary authority to summon
"suspects" (higisha) for questioning in the first stage of the pro-
ceedings, and the preliminary judge had an absolute duty to question
the "accused" (hikokunin) during the second stage, but the suspects
or accused had no duty to answer the questions, nor were they subject
to prosecution for perjury if they lied during questioning.4 Torture
was regarded as impermissible, although that prohibition rested on
the aforementioned 1879 Cabinet Order and was not embodied in
either the Imperial Constitution of 1889 or the various criminal
procedure codes .47
In actual practice, however, heavy emphasis remained upon pro-
curing confessions. To some extent, the safeguard supposedly pro-
vided by placing central investigations under the supervision of
preliminary judges was vitiated, since "[m]ost preliminary judges were
eager to force the accused to confess."' 4 In any event, the police and
prosecutors developed many ways to avoid even that level of super-
vision until they had first secured a confession through their own
methods. Primary means of dispensing with such supervision included
the power to hold "dangerous" individuals or those "needing pro-
tection" under the Administrative Execution Law of 1900, 49 confine
individuals without judicial review under the "Procedure for Summary
Sentence for Violating Police Regulations," 50 and keep suspects in
so-called "consensual custody" (shodaku ryacht).1 Although, at least
41 See, e.g., Appleton, Reforms in Japanese Criminal Procedure Under Allied
Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REv. 401, 401-03 (1949); Gadsby, supra note 16, at 456-
58 (regarding ChizaihU and 1890 Codes); George, supra note 14, at 1147-48.
See George, supra note 14, at 1148; Abe, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14,
at 618 n.25.
47 See Abe, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 618 n.25.
,8 Id. at 618.
49 Gyusei shikkaho, Law No. 84 of 1900.
10 Ikeizai sokketsurei, Cabinet Order No. 31 of 1885. As its title implies, this
provision allowed police to impose summary sentences for misdemeanors, without
any supervision by a judicial body.
51 See H. TAMIYA, KEIrn SOSHUHI NYUMON [INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE LAW] 74 (3d ed. 1982); Abe, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 620. See
generally, e.g., Ushiomi and Watanabe, Senzen ni okeru Nihon no keisatsu [Japan's
Police in the Prewar Era], in M. KAIN6, ED., KEISATSUKEN [POLICE POWERS] 52,
at 75-93 (M. Kaino ed. 1960); Tamiya, Keiji soshuha ni okeru keisatsu no yakuwari
[The Role of Police Under the Criminal Procedure Code], in H5GAKU SEMIN;. Zo
KAN, SG TOKUSHU SHIRZU 13, GENDAI NO KEISATSU [HoGAKU SEMINAR EXTRA
NUMBER, COMPREHENSIVE SPECIAL SERIES No. 13, PRESENT-DAY POLICE] 60 (1980)
[hereinafter GENDAI NO KEISATSU].
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for the first two, there were limits on the length of permissible
custody,5 2 police often avoided the time limits simply by shifting the
prisoners to other police stations before the time limits expired. In
this manner, suspects could be held and subjected to interrogation
for months. 3 Furthermore, torture was by no means rare, although
the methods were for the most part considerably more sophisticated
than in earlier eras.14 In the later prewar days even greater leeway
was permitted for the investigation of communists and other "political
offenders." 55
Confessions were not recorded verbatim. Rather, investigators sum-
marized the confessions in writing; subsequently, the suspect ac-
knowledged the confession summary. With certain minor limitations,
these confession statements were regarded as having full evidentiary
capacity.5 6 Typically, trials consisted primarily of a review of the
dossier compiled by the yoshin hanji, with the confession statements
carrying the greatest weight.
During the prewar period, the evidentiary function of confessions
remained predominant. Confessions were regarded as extremely im-
portant, albeit not absolutely essential, evidence of guilt and continued
to play an important role in investigations of other crimes (both
those of the suspect in question and of accomplices and others). In
addition, confessions also could affect the degree of punishment.
Each of the criminal codes adopted between 1870 and the Criminal
Code of 190717 provided for reductions in punishment for individuals
who turned themselves in and confessed.5" Moreover, during the first
decades of the twentieth century, and certainly by the prewar period,
one begins to find clear evidence of a conscious use of the confession
process for reform of the individual. One noted example of this
52 Custody under administrative detention was limited until sunset of the day
following the arrest, and custody under the summary sentences was limited to twenty-
nine days.
13 See, e.g., Abe, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 619-20; Appleton, supra
note 45, at 410; T. ODANAKA, KEmSOSHUH6 No REKISHIEKI BUNSEKI [HISTORICAL
ANALYsIs OF THE LAW OF CPuIMNA PROCEDURE] 319-20 (1976). Abe, Self-Incrimi-
nation, at 619 n.33, describes one case in which a suspect was thus kept in custody
for 207 days.
14 See generally Abe, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 618-19.
11 See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 45, at 403-04. See generally R. MITCHELL,
THOUGHT CONTROL IN PREwAR JAPAN (1976).
16 See ODANAKA, supra note 53, at 13, 140-45, 301-02, 326-28.
17 Keiha (Penal Code), Law No. 45 of 1907, art. 42 [hereinafrer Penal Code].
58 S&e Rickett, supra note 29, at 802 n.17.
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deliberate emphasis upon confession and repentance, coupled with
relative leniency for those deemed to have truly undertaken a change
in character, is the so-called tenka (conversion) of ideological offen-
ders.59
C. Post-war Reforms
Following World War II, the Occupation authorities regarded the
emphasis on confessions and the use of torture to obtain them as
areas necessitating major reform. In the Political Reorientation of
Japan, 60 a document in which the Occupaton described its perceived
role, the Occupation summarized this matter in the following way:
The worst abuses of civil liberties were not based on statutory
authority, but arose through the use of loopholes deliberately left
in laws and through the development of legal fictions. The provisions
of the codes of criminal procedure proved adequate in the countries
of their origin to protect the individual from limitless powers of
the police and prosecution with regard to arrest, detention, search
and seizure. Under the Japanese practice, however, through the use
of a minor administrative law not challengeable before any court,
the individual was powerless and at the mercy of the police. In spite
of provisions in the Criminal Code which forbade abuse of authority
and torture, the Japanese police extorted confessions by constant
use of third-degree methods and long detention. 6'
Based on this perception, the Occupation insisted upon "elaborate
safeguards for the protection of the individual in the field of criminal
justice. '62 A central change was the imposition of a strict warrant
requirement under which, prior to apprehending a suspect, police
must obtain from a judge an arrest warrant based on reasonable
suspicion and specifying the offense with which the person is charged.63
19 See MITCHELL, supra note 55, at 97-147. See also Dando, System of Discretionary
Prosecution in Japan, 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 518, 518-21 (1970) (noting the conscious
use of discretion in declining to prosecute offenders based on factors including the
character and environment of the offender, a practice in effect since at least 1908,
and with roots as early as 1885).
60 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GOVERNMENT SECTION, PO-
LITICAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN, SEPT. 1945 TO SEPT. 1948; 2 SUPREME COMMANDER
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GOVERNMENT SECTION, POLITICAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN,
SEPT. 1945 TO SEPT. 1948. [hereinafter SCAP].
61 2 SCAP, supra note 60, at 192.
62 Id. at 227.
63 Constitution, supra note 8, arts. 33, 35; Code, supra note 9, art. 199. Exceptions
exist for arresting a person in the act of committing a crime, Constitution art. 33,
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Under Article 36 of the Constitution, "[t]he infliction of torture by
any public officer . . . [is] absolutely forbidden.'"' In addition, the
Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code of 1948 contain a
number of provisions intended to ensure the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to silence-not just at trial, but during
the investigation stage, as well. 65
Through these and related provisions concerning right to counsel
and other matters, the Occupation sought to achieve "a fundamental
and for so-called "emergency arrests" (kinkyii taiho) of persons reasonably believed
to have committed major offenses, if due to the urgency of the situation an arrest
warrant could not be obtained from a judge. Code, art. 210. Immediately after
making an "emergency arrest," the police must request an arrest warrant from a
judge. See DANDo, supra note 15, at 313-17.
64 Constitution, supra note 8, art. 36.
61 These include the following:
Constitution, art. 38:
No person shall be compelled to testify against himself.
Confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged
arrest or detention shall not be admitted in evidence.
No person shall be convicted or punished in cases where the only proof
against him is his own confession.
Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 198:
(1) When the need exists with respect to the investigation of crime, a
public prosecutor . .. or a judicial police official may request a suspect
to appear and may question the suspect; provided, however, that, except
in cases where the suspect is under arrest or under detention, the suspect
may refuse to appear or, having appeared, may leave at any time.
(2) In the case of questioning under the preceding section, the suspect
shall be notified in advance that he may refuse to answer any question.
As amended by Law No. 172 of 1953, this provision now requires that a suspect
be notified "that he need not answer any question against his will."
Art. 291:
After the indictment has been read, the presiding judge must notify the
accused that he may be silent at all times and refuse to answer any
question ....
Art. 311:
The accused may be silent at all times or refuse to answer any question
during the course of the trial.
Art. 319:
Confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged
arrest or detention, or that is suspected not to have been made voluntarily,
shall not be admitted in evidence. The accused shall not be convicted in a
case where his own confession, whether made in open court or not, is the
only proof against him.
For a rather detailed account of the various changes in Japanese criminal procedure
law, by a central participant in the Occupation's work in that area, see Appleton,
supra note 43. See generally A. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN 136-
49 (1976).
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change of the criminological attitude" in Japan.6 In short, the Oc-
cupation attempted to transform the Japanese criminal justice system
from an inquisitorial to a largely accusatorial, adversary system. In
some respects, the reforms appear to have succeeded. The arrest
warrant requirement, for example, has taken root and on the whole
seems to be followed in practice. 67
Moreover, most observers agree that physical abuse has been largely
eliminated, 68 although it would be naive to assume that such abuse
has been completely eradicated. Critics, including representatives of
the defense bar, have raised a number of rumored instances of police
and prosecutorial abuses, including alleged beatings at police stations
throughout Japan. 69 These critics have also argued that the press is
reluctant to report on such allegations, perhaps in part because of
the close relationship between reporters and the police engendered
by the so-called "press clubs"-groups of reporters who regularly
cover a particular police department. 70 Not surprisingly, the police
deny these assertions, and very few of the suspects have either filed
civil suits or requested criminal prosecutions in connection with the
" 2 SCAP, supra note 60, at 227.
67 For a discussion of techniques used to avoid the warrant requirement, however,
see infra notes 132-184 and accompanying text. In this connection, it may also bear
note that in 1988 only seventy-two requests for arrest warrants were rejected, out
of over 133,000 total requests. See SAIKOSAIBANSHO JIMUSOKYOKU, SHOWA 63-NEN,
SHIH5 T6KEi NENP6, 2 KEIn-HEN [GENERAL SECRETARIAT, SUPREME COURT, ANNUAL
REPORT OF JUDICIAL STATISTICS, PART 2, CRIMINAL MATTERS] 16-17 (1988 ed.) (Chart
22). [hereinafter SHmu5 TOKEIl. An additional 270 warrant applications were with-
drawn, and a substantial portion of those presumably were withdrawn following
judicial questioning. This still means that applications for arrest warrants were granted
over 99.7% of the time.
" See, e.g., W. AMEs, POLICE AND COMMUNITY IN JAPAN 134-37 (1981); D. BAYLEY,
FORCES OF ORDER 152-54 (1976); Hirano, Genku keijisosha no shinda [Diagnosis of
Current Criminal Procedure], in DAND5 SHIGEMITSU HAKASE KOKI SHUKUGA RONSHU
DAI-YoN KAN [COLLECTION OF WORKS TO COMMEMORATE THE SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY
OF DR. SHIGEMITSU DANDo] 407, 416 (1985).
69 See supra, sources cited at notes 12 & 13. In a survey of thirty persons who
allegedly had been "falsely accused" between 1949 and 1982 described by Igarashi,
twenty claimed to have been subjected to physical violence. JOINT COMMITTEE, supra
note 13, contains summaries of twenty cases, most containing allegations of physical
abuse, between 1983 and 1989, which it describes as random cases that had come
to the Committee's attention during a three-month survey.
70 See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 3 (coverage by press likely only if the
suspect is acquitted or wins damages in a civil suit against he investigators); A
Japanese Skid Row Erupts, Exposing Nation's Underside, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1990, Al, col. 3, at A10, col. 4 (describing assertions that, because of the existence
of such press clubs, "the reporters in Japan have an overly cozy relationship to the
police and suppress criticism of them.")
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alleged incidents. 71 Since the vast majority of police questioning occurs
behind closed doors, one cannot say with certainty whether the alleged
instances of abuse are simply "the tip of the iceberg," as some critics
contend, 72 or at most a rare aberration, even if true, as the police
would argue. Given the relative paucity of the alleged instances and
accounts by several outsiders who have observed police activities
suggesting at most a limited use of physical force, 73 as well as the
availability of other effective means of obtaining confessions from
suspects, it seems likely that deliberate outright physical abuse is in
fact quite rare. 74
On the other hand, the Occupation was less successful in its efforts
to establish a meaningful right to silence and to change the inquis-
itorial nature of the system and the "criminological attitude" re-
garding the central role of confessions. 75 Most investigators76 were
not happy with the right to silence at the investigation stage; and as
soon as the Occupation ended the police and prosecutors undertook
a direct attack on that right, seeking a legislative modification of
7, Of the twenty cases described in JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 13, for example,
civil suits were being filed in three, the suspects or their familes had requested
criminal charges in three others, and the prosecutors themselves indicted a police
officer in another.
72 Id. at 4.
73 See, e.g., AmEs, supra note 68, at 134-37; BAYLEY, supra note 68, at 152-54;
MIYAZAWA, HANzAi S5SA 0 MEGURU DAuSSEN KEIn No IsHIrKi 0 K5D6 [THE AT-
TITUDES AND ACTIONS OF FRONT-LINE DETECTIVES CONCERNING THE INVESTIGATION
OF CRIME] (1985) [hereinafter MIYAZAWA, HANZM S6SA], translated in part, updated
and supplemented, in S. MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN: A STUDY ON MAKING CRIME
(1991) (forthcoming) [hereinafter MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN]. Although Mi-
yazawa is considerably more critical of police practices than either Ames or Bayley,
he agrees that deliberate physical abuse is not widespread, noting that during his
observation of police in Sapporo he "did not observe any physical abuse of a suspect,
much less a shooting." He attributes this in part to the existence of the various
other techniques for obtaining confessions that I discuss below. S. MIYAZAWA,
POLICING IN JAPAN, supra, ch. 15.
14 Other techniques alleged by critics include use of a sloping chair, designed so
that the suspect will slide forward off the seat unless the suspect constantly maintains
pressure on his or her legs, N. AKIYAMA, IKAR No TEJO [HANDCUFFS OF ANGER],
16 (rev. ed. 1987) and forcing suspects to sit on their knees (seiza) for several hours.
For me, an American not used to sitting on my knees, even fifteen minutes of seiza
can be "torture," but it's still a far cry from the gamon of old.
71 But see George, "supra note 14, at 1166-67 (concluding that, as of 1968, "in
major outline and in most details, the concept of a privilege to remain silent has
proven acceptable both to the Japanese public and the legal profession.")
76 The term "investigators" is used throughout to refer collectively to the police
and public prosecutors.
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relevant statutory provisions. 7 7 The only concrete change they were
able to obtain was an amendment modifying the warning they were
required to give suspects: from a notification that the suspect "may
refuse to answer any question" to one that he "need not answer any
question against his will." ' 78 One former prosecutor, writing in the
1950s, reported that many investigators deliberately failed to give the
warning in any case. 79 Other prosecutors have contested that account
and argue that, if it ever was true, it is no longer the case. 80 In any
event, investigators can easily make either of the above statements
sound equivocal (especially given the statutory requirement8' that
investigators also provide the suspect with an opportunity to explain),
so the practical significance of the modest change in the nature of
the warning is questionable.
Moreover, regardless of the warning requirement, the existing stat-
utory system itself provides ample means for obtaining confessions
despite the right to silence. The current Criminal Procedure Code,
both on its face and as interpreted, leaves police and prosecutors
many tools that aid in procuring confessions. These include the normal
standards for interrogation of suspects after a lawful arrest, as well
as certain techniques for avoiding the warrant requirement. These
are complemented by the prevailing standards limiting rights to com-
municate with attorneys and the outside world.12
II. CURRENT STATUS OF INTERROGATION OF SUSPECTS
A. Basic Standards for Interrogation
The most fundamental tool for obtaining confessions lies in the
standards for post-arrest interrogation themselves. These standards
provide the police and prosecutors with up to twenty-three days to
17 See, e.g., Abe, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 624; K. MATSUO, Kaij1
SOSH(HO (J) [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW] 62 (1979).
71 Amendment to Code, supra note 9, art. 198(2), pursuant to Law No. 172 of
1953.
19 See Abe, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 624 (about one third of inves-
tigators at Tokyo District Attorney's Office "practically dispense with the notification
of the privilege," and another third gave the notification "in such a sarcastic manner
that the suspects might take the meaning adversely.")
80 Personal conversations of author with Haruki Sugiyama, March 15, 1991. The
discussion included various issues of Japanese criminal procedure.
11 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
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interrogate a suspect before they must file an indictment.8 3 In theory,
the suspect has the right to refuse to answer any questions. Under
prevailing interpretations, however, the suspect must at least submit
to questioning throughout that period and is given very little contact
with defense counsel or the outside world during the course of the
interrogation.8
Following a valid arrest pursuant to a warrant 8 police are entitled
to hold a suspect for up to forty-eight hours before they must either
release him or turn him over to the public prosecutor's office, along
with the evidence already collected. 6 Thereafter, the prosecutor may
hold the suspect for twenty-four additional hours before taking formal
action. By the end of that twenty-four hour period, the prosecutor
must either release the suspect, institute prosecution, or ask a judge
to authorize detention for ten more days. 7 In the great majority of
cases, prosecutors opt for such additional detention.8 8 The Code calls
for the judge to grant such a request promptly, although a proviso
to the relevant article requires the judge to deny the request if he
or she finds that no reason for detention exists. 89 Judges almost
always grant such requestsP ° At the end of the first ten days of
11 See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
85 Prior to issuing a warrant, a judge must determine that there are reasonable
grounds to suspect that the person in question has committed the crime alleged,
Code, supra note 9, art. 199(1). In addition, pursuant to a 1953 amendment to the
Code, the judge is not to issue a warrant if he or she determines that the arrest is
"clearly unnecessary," id., art. 199(2) proviso (added by Law No. 172 of 1953).
With regard to the latter determination, Rule 143-3 of the Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, Sup. Ct. Rules No. 32 of 1948, specifies as key factors the fear of the
suspect's flight or destruction of evidence.
86 Code, supra note 9, art. 203(1). See generally DANDO, supra note 15, at 313-
319; Abe, Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations Under Foreign Law: Japan,
52 J. CR. L., CRIMINOL. & POLICE Sci. 67 (1961).
87 Code, supra note 9, art. 205(1). Technically speaking, this is not additional
"detention." The initial period of up to seventy-two hours is regarded as custody
following arrest. The term "detention" (k~ryU) is a term of art used to refer to
the period in custody pursuant to a warrant for detention under the Code, supra
note 9, art. 207.
88 In 1988, prosecutors requested detention for over 85% of all suspects who had
been held following their arrest, Homusho, supra note 9, at 103.
" Code, supra note 9, art. 207(2). The determination of reasons entails a two-
step process, first to ascertain that a reasonable basis exists for believing that the
suspect committed the crime, and then to determine that the suspect does not have
a fixed address or that there is a fear he would either flee or destroy evidence.
90 In 1988, such requests were granted nearly 99.9% of the time, HMUSH6, supra
note 11, at 103. No formal mechanism exists for a judge to grant detention yet
430 [Vol. 21:415
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detention, prosecutors may request an additional ten days before they
must either file an indictment or release the suspect. 9' Prosecutors
request such extended detention for over one-third of the detained
suspects. 92
Thus, in total the investigators may keep a suspect in custody for
up to twenty-three days before filing any charges. During this period
suspects are typically held in so-called "substitute prison" (daiyu
kangoku), generally holding cells of police stations, where they are
readily available for questioning-questioning that may run all day
and on occasion late into the evening. 93
Judging from the statutory grounds for detention-prevention of
flight and the destruction of evidence-it would not appear that the
detention period is meant as an investigatory tool, and defense counsel
and some scholars have long maintained that detention should not
be utilized for questioning of the suspect. 94 In practice, however,
prosecutors routinely use detention time to firm up their case by
obtaining detailed confessions from the suspect and procuring other
physical evidence based upon the suspect's statements. In the words
of one Ministry of Justice official, "When all is said and done, pre-
indictment detention in Japan is for the purposes of questioning the
suspect, demanding a confession, and pursuing other crimes. If some-
one were to tell you otherwise, I'd say that's a lie." 95
limit it to a shorter period. Some judges request prosecutors to limit the detention
to only five additional days in certain relatively minor cases, and that in such cases
the prosecutors ordinarily comply with that request. In 1987 slightly over 2076 of
suspects who were formally detained were released within five days after the start
of the formal detention, HW5musH [MINISTRY or JUSTICE], DM-113 KENSATSU
ThKEI NENPO, SHUWA 62 NEN [ANNUAL REPORT OF STATISTICS ON PROSECUTION FOR
1987] 248-249 (1988) (Chart 34) [hereinafter KENSATSU T5KEI NENP6].
9, Code, supra note 9, art. 208. In certain types of cases, including insurrection
and riot, this period may be extended up to an additional five days, Code, art. 208-
2. See DANDO, supra note 15, at 318.
92 These requests are granted in virtually all cases. See KENSATSU TOKEi NENP6,
supra note 90, at 248-49 (Chart 34). In 1987, requests for extended detention were
granted nearly 99.907o of the time.
93 For discussions of daiya kangoku and problems associated with it, see, e.g.,
SUSA To JINIKEN, supra note 13, at 63-79; Araki, Higisha-hikounin no migara o
doko ni okubeki ka [Where Should Suspects and the Accused be Kept?], 55:2
HURITSU JIHm 43 (1983).
" See, e.g., Araki, Enzai bushi to saibankan no yakuwari [Prevention of False
Accusations and the Role of Judges], 55:7 KEISATSU KENKYU 33, 37 (1984).
" Kensatsu no shomondai (2, kan) (zadankai) [Various Issues Relating to Pros-
ecution (Part 2, Conclusion) (Roundtable Discussion)], 13 Hs5 JmI5 1050, 1058
(1961) (statement of Masayoshi Honda, translated by the author).
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B. Suspects' Rights
Superficially, suspects appear to be protected by two key rights
during detention: the right to an attorney and the right to silence.
On closer examination, however, one may wonder how meaningful
these rights are in practice.
1. Right to Counsel
At the time of arrest, police are required to inform the suspect of
his or her right to designate an attorney. 96 At this stage, however,
the suspect must be prepared to retain his or her own attorney; the
right to a publicly appointed counsel for indigents does not come
into effect until prosecution is instituted. 97 Moreover, even if the
suspect is notified of the right to counsel and designates an attorney,
the suspect is not likely to have much opportunity to confer with
counsel during preindictment detention. Article 39 of the Code spe-
cifically provides that prosecutors and police may designate the time,
place, and duration of meetings with counsel during the preindictment
period "when necessary for the investigation." 98
Despite a statement by the Supreme Court in 1978 that designation
is an "exceptional measure [to be used only] when necessary,""
investigators have not been shy about using this authority. Prosecutors
have long followed a two-step approach to designation that h4s the
effect of limiting meetings with counsel for many suspects. First, a
so-called "general designation" may be issued to the person in charge
of the facility where a suspect is being held.' °° In principle, if no
general designation has been issued, counsel is free to meet with the
suspect. If such a general designation has been issued, however,
defense counsel will be permitted to meet with that suspect only if
counsel first obtains from the prosecutor a "specific designation"
form, which specifies the date and time of the permitted meeting.
Through this process, meetings with counsel have been sharply limited,
See Constitution, supra note 8, art. 34, cl. 1; Code, supra note 9, art. 203;
cf. Judgment of Dec. 5, 1950, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 4 KEISHU 2481 (Odera v.
Japan).
91 See Code, supra note 9, art. 272.
11 Code, supra note 9, art. 39(3).
Judgment of July 10, 1978, Saikasai (Supreme Court), 32 MINSHu 820, 829
(Sugiyama v. Osaka Pref.) (denying an attorney's request for damage allegedly
resulting when he was physically restrained from meeting a suspect).
,00 See Tamiya, On the Designation of Communication with Counsel, 4 LAW IN
JAPAN: AN ANNuAL 87, at 88 (1970).
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both in number and length. By one estimate, defense attorneys gen-
erally have been allowed one visit during a suspect's time in police
custody, and from two to five during the twenty days in prosecutors'
custody, with each meeting averaging only about fifteen minutes. 0'
In a rather early case concerning the scope of permissible limitations,
the Supreme Court even upheld the prosecutors' refusal to allow the
first meeting with counsel until the day on which they completed
their investigation and filed the indictment. 0 2 As a general rule,
moreover, for those suspects for whom a general designation has
been issued, prosecutors will seek a court order banning meetings
with family and friends during the period of arrest and detention,
and such court orders are normally issued as a matter of course. 03
Presumably in response to widespread criticisms of the severity of
these limitations, in 1989 the Public Prosecutor's Office, through
changes in internal guidelines, undertook some relaxation of the
system for meetings with counsel. First, the prosecutors narrowed
the categories of crimes for which the general designation is to be
issued to such cases as conspiracies, bribery cases, election law viol-
ations, drug dealing cases (currently the largest category of general
designation cases), and other cases in which prosecutors feel that the
case is complex or there is a possibility that evidence might be altered.
In cases where a general designation has been issued, moreover,
procedures for obtaining the specific designation have been relaxed:
counsel no longer need obtain the designation in person, but instead
may obtain it by facsimile or by a telephone call to the prosecutor
in charge of the case. In addition, prosecutors have adopted a more
flexible attitude toward designation of dates and times for meetings,
permitting meetings at the dates and times requested by defense
counsel unless the suspect is actually undergoing interrogation at that
time or has been taken outside of the detention facility to view the
crime scene or for other such investigative purposes.1 4
10, D. Bayley, supra note 68, at 151-52. A similar estimate is contained in Abe,
supra note 79, at 70-71 (one 15-20 minute meeting per defense counsel during each
10-day period in detention; up to six such meetings if a suspect has three defense
counsel). For further discussion of this issue, see generally Itoh, supra note 12, at
54-61; Tamiya, supra note 100, passim.
102 Judgment of April 20, 1955, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 54 HAIn 27.
103 Such orders are permitted under Code, supra note 9, art. 81.
104 Although the contents of these guidelines have been described informally by
prosecutors, the guidelines themselves were announced through an internal document
which has never been formally disclosed to the public or the practicing bar.
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It is probably no mere coincidence that these guidelines reflect
principles set out by the Supreme Court. 05 The new standards, how-
ever, are only internal standards for guidance of prosecutors; they
are not binding and may be ignored in any given case. In fact, the
relaxed standards expressly do not apply in the more difficult and
complex cases, and interrogation of a suspect would not normally
be interrupted for a meeting with counsel. Article 39 does, after all,
permit designation "when necessary for the investigation," and the
prosecutors' position remains that meetings with counsel will not
normally be allowed if they might interfere with the degree of ques-
tioning deemed necessary to elucidate the facts of a crime. Moreover,
in no event, is counsel permitted to attend the actual questioning.
Finally, it bears repeating that the right to appointed counsel for
indigents arises only after indictment; the above debate has practical
significance only for suspects able to retain attorneys who have time
for meetings.
2. The Right to Silence
The other main protection lies in the right to silence itself. In
practice, however, there are many reasons why the right to silence
does not quite function in the manner that its name implies. One
factor is the method used to notify the suspect of this right. As
mentioned above, Article 198(2) of the Code requires that a suspect
be informed prior to questioning that he or she need not answer any
question "against his [or her] will." Yet a separate provision, Article
203(1), stipulates that when police arrest a suspect they must im-
mediately explain the crime of which he or she is suspected and
provide the suspect with the opportunity to give an explanation.106
In view of that provision, one can easily imagine a police officer
arresting a suspect and, prior to making any mention of the right
to silence, announcing, "We know you committed this crime, but
the law says you have to have the chance to give your side of it. So
what's your explanation?" The apparent inconsistency between the
requirement of providing an opportunity to explain oneself and no-
tification of the right to silence was early resolved in favor of the
former: in 1952 the Supreme Court ruled that when giving the suspect
the opportunity to explain, the police need not mention the right to
10, See Judgment of July 10, 1978, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 32 MissHU 820
(Sugiyama v. Osaka Pref.).
"0 Code, supra note 9, art. 203(1) (emphasis added).
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silence; the transcript of the explanatory statement can still be used
as evidence.' °7
As noted earlier, it has been reported that even at the start of
questioning, investigators sometimes neglect to inform the suspect of
the right not to answer questions or give the warning in such an
offhand manner that it is not understood as a serious option 0 8
(although prosecutors assure me that this is no longer the case).' °9
In cases where no warning is given, that failure will not affect the
admissibility of statements made by the suspect. In another early
opinion, the Supreme Court held that failure to notify a suspect of
the right to silence is not a constitutional violation and does not
render a subsequent confession either involuntary or inadmissible." 0
C. Duty to Submit to Questioning-"Torishirabe Junin Gimu"
Even when a warning is given, doubts exist as to how much effect
it will have in the face of the subsequent investigation. Within ac-
ademic circles there is an ongoing debate as to whether a suspect in
custody following arrest or detention may refuse to sit through ques-
tioning and may demand to be allowed to leave the interrogation
room. This debate centers on the meaning of the proviso to Article
198(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads: "[E]xcept
in cases where the suspect is under arrest or in detention, the suspect
may refuse to appear [for questioning] or, having appeared, may
leave at any time."
That proviso was added at the insistence of the Occupation. After
the Japanese drafters proposed granting investigators the authority
to summon and interrogate a suspect whenever necessary for the
investigation, with no mention of any right for the suspect to refuse,
SCAP insisted upon adding a provision that the suspect "has the
right to refuse to answer, and, if not under arrest, may withdraw at
any time.'" I
Despite the clear evidence of its origin, however, the meaning of
the proviso remains in controversy. Under the literal Japanese text,
107 Judgment of March 28, 1952, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 6 Keishl 520 (Kaneyasu
v. Japan).
,o See Abe, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 624.
101 Personal conversations of author with Haruki Sugiyama, March 15, 1991. The
discussion included various issues of Japanese criminal procedure. But cf. MIYAZAWA,
HANzAi S6SA, supra note 75, at 247 (in one observed case immediately after telling
suspect, "You don't have to say anything," police officer demanded, "Now talk.").
10 Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 4 KeishU 2359 (Shirogane v. Japan).
"' See K. MATSUO, supra note 77, at 62; SCAP, supra note 60.
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the rights to refuse to appear for questioning and to leave apply only
to those not under arrest or in detention."12 Thus, under the prevailing,
literal view arrestees and detainees have no right to leave the inter-
rogation room and hence are in effect under a duty to submit to
questioning (known as torishirabe junin gimu). Counter to this view,
Professor Ryuichi Hirano argued that the proviso was intended only
to clarify that those under arrest had no right to leave the place of
detention, but that in light of the intent of the Constitution it was
clear that they had the right to refuse to sit through questioning."'
The Hirano view has gained much support among academics," 4 but
the literal interpretation remains dominant in actual practice." 5 Ac-
cordingly, suspects have no choice but to submit to questioning
throughout post-arrest custody, which, as noted above, may last as
long as twenty-three days, although they need not answer any ques-
tions during that time.
Typically, notification of the right to silence is given only once at
the very outset of questioning; warnings are not repeated at the start
of subsequent interrogation sessions during the suspect's detention." 6
Moreover, even if the suspect asserts the right to silence, it will not
terminate the questioning; no matter how many times a suspect asserts
that right nor how long he or she maintains absolute silence, the
investigators may continue to talk to the suspect and address questions
to him or her throughout the period of detention, until the suspect
finally gives in and begins to talk.
"I SCAP's description of this provision differs slightly from the final Japanese
text. The summary contained in THE POLITICAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN, reads as
follows: "Under the new code, persons asked to appear for interrogation by police
or procurators will even have the right to refuse and, if they do appear, may refuse
to answer any questions and, if not under arrest, may leave at any time." 2 SCAP,
supra note 60, at 228. As with the Japanese text, that explanation, interpreted
literally, would not permit one under arrest to leave at any time. Unlike the Japanese
version, however, under the literal language of SCAP's summary even one who is
under arrest would have the option of refusing to appear for questioning in the
first place.
M HIRANO, KELTI SOSHO8O [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 106 (1958).
"14 See, e.g., Araki, Higisha ni wa "torishirabe no junin gimu" ga aru ka [Do
Suspects Have a "Duty to Submit" to Questioning?], in JURISUTO ZOKAN, KErI
SOSHUHU No S5TEN [JURIST EXTRA NUMBER, ISSUES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 60
(1979), and materials cited therein [hereinafter JURISUTO ZOKAN].
- See I KErn SOSHUH6 [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 319 (H. Tamiya ed. 1975); N.
MURAKAMI, KEIJIHU JUTEN K6ZA, TORISHIRABE [LECTURES ON KEY ASPECTS OF CRIM-
INAL LAW, INTERROGATION] 5-6 (1979).
116 See George, supra note 14, at 1152; MURAXAMI, supra note 115, at 6-8, and
cases cited therein.
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D. Interrogation Techniques
Thus, the foregoing analysis indicates that investigators have plenty
of time in which to obtain a confession. As a handbook on inves-
tigative techniques emphasizes, "patience and perseverance" are keys
to good investigations." 7 Interrogation should be treated "like a
balloon. If you push suddenly, it will break; the true skill lies in
pushing gradually and steadily.""' The handbook continues:
Among the suspects are some who begin by maintaining silence
and refusing to speak for no valid reason .... But even though
they deny [the crime], most will admit to established facts and to
evidence that has been collected. In the face of skilled persuasion,
questioning, and pursuit by the interrogator, they will find it more
and more difficult to maintain their denial, and will eventually be
forced to the point where they have to confess to the full story." 9
That handbook contains a revealing account of interrogation of
suspects who either deny their involvement or maintain silence-
categories that are treated as essentially equivalent. The discussion
begins by stating that in earlier times investigations proceeded "from
the person to the evidence," with the focus on eliciting a confession
from the suspect and then using that confession to find corroborating
evidence. Investigations now move in the opposite direction-"from
the evidence to the person."' 20 Nonetheless, "obtaining confessions
is ...indispensable to criminal investigations"; the "inability to get
a true confession from the person who has committed the crime leaves
a bad aftertaste."'12'
The process should begin by selecting good interrogators, "based
on [agreement with] the collective spirit that inability to force a full
confession is the responsibility of all the investigators."' 22 As for the
117 M. SUZUKI, HiGisHA TORISHIRABE No JISSAI [THE TRUE SITUATION OF INTER-
ROGATION OF SUSPECTS] 161-62 (rev. ed. 1972). Similar views are contained in another
handbook by an experienced investigator, M. TSUNAKAWA, HiGisHA No ToRIsIIRABE
GIJUTSU [THE ART OF INTERROGATING SUSPECTS] 27-31 (1977).
"' SUZUKI, supra note 117, at 86-87.
,,9 Id. at 13. Cf. TSUNAKAWA, supra note 118, at 29-30 ("If, then, questioning
is a struggle with the suspect, a test of guts, in short, a type of battle, . . . who's
in the stronger position? The suspect has the right to silence and other legally
recognized defense rights. But . . . the suspect is beset by anxieties and, when in
detention, is cut off from the outside world . . . and faces great uncertainty.")
120 SuzuKI, supra note 117, at 143.
121 Id. at 144. See also MIYAZAWA, HANzAI SGSA, supra note 75, at 240, 243-44
(police regard obtaining confessions as essential to investigation).
"2 SUZUKI, supra note 117, at 148.
1991]
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
questioning itself, it should usually be conducted one-on-one, isolated
from other people, since this is normally the most psychologically
conducive to a confession. In some cases, though, it is more effective
to use two or three questioners . 23 The non-public, confrontational
nature of the interrogation is important, so the setting for the in-
terrogation should be selected carefully. The ideal interrogation room:
(a) should be cut off from outside noise and have no visual dis-
tractions; (b) should be small, ideally with no windows, or with
clouded glass, so that the suspect is not distracted by changes in the
weather; (c) should have no telephone or bells that might distract
the suspect; (d) should have few decorations, and only essential
furnishings (such as a desk, chairs, and a bookrack); and (e) should
have lighting that is not too bright, focussed on the suspect's face
from behind the interrogator. 24
As to the notification of the right to silence, the handbook contains
the following advice:
The legal process calls for informing the suspect of the right to
refuse to testify at the start of questioning .... Depending on the
manner in which this notification is given, it can harden the denial
or be interpreted in a good light. Some suspects will take the
notification as an indication of the fairness of the investigators, and
by removing the preconception that the investigators will be un-
pleasant the warning can in fact lead to an invisible benefit in the
form of an affinity to the investigators. It is not enough, however,
simply to give this warning in the specified form. If the investigator
tells the suspect that he or she must confess before the echo of the
notification has even died away, this benefit will be lost.
The following sort of statements should be added: "If you don't
want to' talk, that right is recognized so you're free not to do so.
But if you don't give any answer to the questions, people-not just
me, you understand, but everyone-will think that you're hiding
something. Think about that. Won't you just be in a worse position?
There are probably things that would help you, things you want to
talk about; but even those won't come out. I'm simply doing my
job and trying to resolve this by discovering the truth." Of course,
if the investigator is too obvious [about turning the warning into a
request for information], there is a risk that the suspect will become
hostile. So it is essential to bear in mind that the manner in which
the warning is given can lead to a denial. 125
2 Id. at 152.
124 Id. at 153-54. See TSUNAKAWA, supra note 117, at 98-100.
125 SuzuKi, supra note 117, at 155-56.
[Vol. 21:415
THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN JAPAN
The handbook then discusses various techniques for the actual
questioning. It notes that the proper technique will vary depending
upon the case and the stage of interrogation. In difficult cases, it
recommends starting with generalities to get the suspect talking, turn-
ing to the crime itself only after completing the first couple of sessions.
Although there is no suggestion of physical compulsion, the book
strongly advocates psychological pressure. Pointers include showing
sympathy and understanding-emphasizing that the victim and society
are also to blame and the suspect need not suffer alone-and strongly
emphasizing that continued silence will only work to the suspect's
disadvantage, for other evidence exists which compels the same result
whether the suspect confesses or not. 26 The "Mutt and Jeff" rou-
tine-tough interrogator/sympathetic friend-is also recommended. 27
In no event, warns the handbook, should the suspect be given priv-
ileges, "such as the opportunity to meet with his or her family," in
return for a pledge to confess, since that would provide the basis
for a claim that the confession was induced by promises of benefits. 128
In addition, the handbook notes that many suspects assert alibis
and suggests that when no other evidence can be found to disprove
such alibis, investigators have no choice but to break down the alibi
during the interrogation. It recommends continued questioning until
the suspect eventually runs into so many inconsistencies that he or
she will be forced to give up and admit that the story was just a
fiction. 2 9 To demonstrate the importance of patience and persever-
ance, the handbook contains numerous examples of suspects who
confessed only after many days of questioning. 30
Other materials on interrogation techniques confirm the approach
described above."' In the face of extended questioning under these
conditions, one possibly equivocal recitation of "the right not to
answer questions against one's will" scarcely seems sufficient to
'1 Id. at 156-61.
27 Id. at 166.
,21 Id. at 111-12 (emphasis added).
129 Id. at 174.
110 Id. at 95-102 (confession on tenth day); 106-09 (confession on fifteenth day).
- See generally TSUNAKAWA, supra note 117; S. KAwAi, ToKuso KENJI NOTO
[NOTES OF A SPECIAL CRIMES PROSECUTOR] (1986); Hotta, Tadashiku jihak saseru
hoho [Methods for Forcing Accurate Confessions], 533 HANEi TAIMUzu 51 (1984),
and materials cited therein; MIYAZAWA, HANZAI So$A, supra note 75 (containing
numerous case studies and results of surveys regarding police attitudes toward
questioning); MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN, supra note 75 (translation of above
cited article, containing supplemental information).
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guarantee the right to silence. To the contrary, with up to twenty-
three days to interrogate a suspect who remains virtually incom-
municado, the author's faith in patient questioning seems entirely
justified.
III. POTENTIAL MEANS FOR AVOIDING LIMITS ON INVESTIGATION
A. Arrest for a Separate Incident- "Bekken Taiho'"
One might think that Japanese investigators should be satisfied
with these basic standards. Yet the normal custodial interrogation
period is not always enough. Sometimes police do not have sufficient
grounds to make an initial arrest on a crime, and in a few cases
investigators find that the suspect simply refuses to give in during
the first twenty-three days. In these cases, police may resort to other
tools for detaining the suspect for questioning. The technique that
appears most frequently in case accounts is bekken taiho (arrest for
a separate incident.)12
This technique involves just what its name implies. Even though
police may lack sufficient evidence to link the suspect to the crime
in chief, they often uncover evidence of some relatively minor crime.
Using this evidence, they obtain an arrest warrant and use the post-
arrest custodial investigation period-which, even on a minor crime,
may extend for the full twenty-three days-to interrogate the suspect
on the crime they initially pursued. If the initial detention period still
proves too short, rearrest on some other minor crime (and consequent
renewed detention for investigation) remains a possibility. In extreme
cases, the cycle may be repeated several times.'
A leading Japanese criminal procedure scholar described bekken
taiho as an investigative technique unique to postwar Japan. 34 During
prewar years, police had no need for this technique, for they had
other means sufficient to hold suspects for questioning. Left without
these techniques, postwar investigators turned to bekken taiho as the
132 See generally KUMAGAI, BEKKEN TAiHO No KENKYY [RESEARCH ON BEKKEN
TAIHO] (1972).
M For example, in the so-called Shiratori case, Judgment of Oct. 17, 1963,
Saikasai (Supreme Court), 17 Keisht 1795 (Japan v. Murakami), the suspect was
arrested on a total of fourteen different crimes, and the total period in detention-
which apparently included time pending trial on some of those charges-lasted for
almost three years, see Matsuoka, Shiratori liken [The Shiratori Case], in KEn
SAISHIN No KENKYfU [RESEARCH ON CRIMINAL RETRIALS] 357 (Y. Kamo ed. 1980).
134 H. Tamiya, supra note 51, at 74.
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simplest device for obtaining custody of a suspect-and eliciting the
desired confession-when there is insufficient evidence for arrest on
the crime in chief.
Nevertheless, the process is not quite as simple as it seems. First,
the "other crime" cannot be too minor; to obtain an arrest warrant
the crime in question ordinarily must be punishable by a fine of at
least 100,000 yen.'35 That figure, however, leaves considerable latitude,
for offenses such as fraud, 3 6 assault,'37 petty larceny,3 " and virtually
any sort of trespassing'39 will suffice. Moreover, this limit does not
apply if the suspect lacks a fixed address or refuses a request to
appear at the station voluntarily for questioning "without good
cause. ' '40
Another potentially important limitation on this technique is the
requirement that the police and/or prosecutors obtain judicial ap-
proval at several stages of their investigation. First, they must get a
warrant authorizing the initial arrest on the "other" crime. Three
days later, they must seek permission for a ten day extension of the
detention period relating to the "other" crime; this process must be
repeated if they want an additional ten days of detention. Subse-
quently, if they have gathered enough evidence to arrest on the main
crime, they normally will seek an additional arrest warrant for that
crime. Following the second warrant will be one or two requests for
extensions of the detention period relating to that main crime. At
each of these stages, the judge must determine the existence of
reasonable grounds to suspect that the individual committed the crime
alleged and ascertain that the arrest or detention is appropriate.'
41
Moreover, at each of these stages and again at the trial itself, the
suspect theoretically has the right to protest that he or she has been
subjected to illegal arrest or detention.
Thus, certain procedural safeguards exist. Nevertheless, the practice
of bekken taiho went largely unnoticed and unchecked for many
years after the adoption of the new Code. Moreover, the very sim-
"I Code, supra note 9, art. 199(l), as modified by the Fines, Etc., Temporary
Measures Act, Law No. 251 of 1948, art. 3.
136 Penal Code, supra note 57, art. 246(1) (up to 10 years).
117 Id., art. 208 (up to 2 years).
38 Id., art. 235 (larceny, with no specification of minimum value, punishable by
up to 10 years).
139 Id., art. 130 (up to 3 years).
,40 Code, supra note 9, art. 199(1) (emphasis added).
" See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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plicity of the technique and the relative ease of finding some minor
transgression by virtually any suspect made this a key means of
circumventing the warrant requirement and the right to silence.
Bekken taiho was extensively used, apparently without much notice,
after the new Code of Criminal Procedure went into effect in 1947.
In 1955, the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court issued a decision
upholding the practice. 42 In that case, known as the Teigin case,
police originally arrested the suspect on suspicion of having murdered
twelve people in the process of robbing a bank. The police and
prosecutors were unable to secure a confession to that crime, yet
during their questioning, they learned of a separate fraudulent in-
cident. They then indicted the suspect for the fraud and continued
to interrogate him pending the fraud trial until they finally obtained
a confession to the murders about a month and a half later. In
upholding his murder conviction, the Supreme Court rather summarily
rejected assertions that the investigation had been unlawful. The Court
described this case as one in which investigators simply discovered
the fraud during their investigation of the murders, rather than one
in which they deliberately indicted the suspect on the fraud charge
in order to investigate the murders.
This reasoning, however, laid the theoretical groundwork for several
subsequent lower court decisions ruling bekken taiho illegal. 43 In
1963, a district court for the first time clearly stated-albeit in dictum-
that it would be illegal for investigators to arrest a suspect on one
charge simply as a pretext for questioning him on some other matter.'"
In 1969, a district court actually held a bekken taiho illegal. In the
Takoshima145 case, a schoolboy disappeared on his way home from
school and was found dead the next morning. The police initially
arrested a fifty-two year old man on a separate charge of larceny.
After thirteen days of confinement and interrogation, he confessed
to the murder. Despite the confession, however, he turned out to
142 Judgment of April 6, 1955, Saikasai (Supreme Court), 9 Keisht 663 (Hirasawa
v. Japan). In this case, Sadamichi Hirasawa was convicted of murdering 12 employees
of the Teikoku Ban in 1948 by deceiving them into drinking poison as a supposed
protection against dysentery. Hirasawa died in 1987, while his eighteenth petition
for a new trial was pending; see Decision of July 13, 1987, Chisai (District Court),
1246 HA~JI 144 (To Hori District Court) rejecting that retrial petition.
14 See I. KEuI SosH HIs, supra note 115, at 272.
" Judgment of March 11, 1964, 6 Keishti 206, (Japan v. Ishikawa) (Urawa District
Court), aff'd, Judgment of Oct. 31, 1974, 756 HANn 3 (Toyko High Court).
14 Judgment of June 3, 1969, 1 Keiji Saiban Geppa [Keisai Geppd] 657 (Japan
v. Takai) (Kanazawa District Court).
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have a valid alibi and was released. The police then turned to another
suspect, a sixteen year old carpenter's apprentice. They obtained a
warrant for his arrest on suspicion of trespassing and his having
stolen four record albums. After six days of custody and questioning,
he too confessed to the murder. He then was rearrested on the murder
charge and held for twenty-three more days of questioning before
being indicted for murder.
The trial court found that the bekken taiho in this case was merely
a pretext to which the police resorted when they had nothing more
than a hunch to go on. According to the court, bekken taiho violated
the spirit of the Code in that it "viewed arrest and detention as
means for obtaining confessions" and constituted an illegal attempt
to evade the time limits on pre-indictment detention.'" Moreover,
since investigators used the bekken taiho to bypass judicial review
of warrant requests, it also violated the warrant requirements con-
tained both in the Code and the Constitution. 147 The court proceeded
to hold that these procedural violations required exclusion of both
the original and subsequent confessions.
To an American reader, the exclusion of the confession might seem
to follow naturally from the finding of an illegal arrest and inter-
rogation. Yet since the exclusionary rule is invoked only rarely in
Japan,'4 this decision attracted much attention. As a leading criminal
procedure scholar observed, however, the exclusion of the confession
was rendered much less "shocking" because it apparently had no
effect on the case's result. The court seemed convinced that the youth
was innocent in any event, for virtually no other evidence linked the
suspect to the murder. Accordingly, exclusion of the confession had
no impact on the outcome of the case.' 49
In a twenty year period subsequent to that decision, a number of
other courts have excluded confessions in bekken taiho cases."10 As
-1 Keisai Geppa at 674-75.
147 Id.
148 See generally M. INOUYE, KEU Sosma Ni OKERU SHAKO HAuO [EXCLUSION OF
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (1985).
'49 Matsuo, Bekken taiho to jihaku no kyoyasei [Bekken taiho and the Compelled
Nature of Confessions], 432 JURISUTO 108, 113 (1969).
11o These include the so-called Tokyo Bed case, Judgment of Feb. 26, 1970, 2
Keisai Geppa 137 (Tokyo District Court), in which the Tokyo District Court excluded
a confession to a series of arsons that had been obtained during interrogation of
the suspect after he was arrested for trespassing when he wandered into his neighbor's
garden one night, apparently while sleepwalking after taking sleeping pills. A more
recent decision is the so-called Case of the Murder of a Kagoshima Couple, Judgment
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in Takoshima, however, in most of these cases the exclusion of
evidence has not affected the actual outcome of the case.' At the
same time, numerous other courts have upheld investigations involving
bekken taiho.1 2 Both courts and academics have split over the proper
limits of bekken taiho and the appropriate theoretical framework for
analyzing the issue.'53 Despite numerous opportunities to review bek-
ken taiho cases, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
question that it left open in the Teigin case-whether arrest on a
separate minor crime purely as a pretext for interrogation on a more
serious crime would be legal.5 4
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that police have
continued to make widespread use of bekken taiho. After all, as a
practical matter, the only potential deterrent at present appears to
be the threat that confessions illegally obtained through bekken taiho
may be excluded. Yet exclusion of confessions still remains very rare
and is virtually unheard of in cases where a guilty person would go
free as a result. Accordingly, the decisions holding bekken taiho
of April 28, 1986, 1201 HANII 3 (Japan v. Funasako) (Fukuoka High Court). In
that case, which involved the 1969 murder of a wife and husband, the suspect,
Kiyoshi Funasako, confessed after two and a half months of interrogation while
under a series of bekken taiho arrests for fraud and other minor crimes. The key
evidence against him consisted of his confession and a pubic hair supposedly found
on the body of the woman. Funasako was originally convicted, but the Supreme
Court remanded after identifying several weaknesses in the original evidence. In
addition to concerns over the reliability of the confession, the Court noted flaws in
the evidentiary value of the pubic hair. Investigators had taken twenty-three pubic
hairs from Funasako as "samples," but later were able to account for only eighteen
of those hairs, leaving the possibility that they might have planted one of the
remaining hairs. When the prosecutors suddenly came up with "the missing pubic
hairs," they turned out to be from someone's head. See Usui, Kinji no saibanrei
kara mita sasa shorija no mondaiten [Problems With Regard to the Handling of
Investigations, as Seen in Recent Court Decisions] pts. 1 & 2, KEISATSUGAKU
RONSHU 36:2, at 33-40, (1983), KEISATSUGAU RONSHtU 36:3, at 98-99 (1983). On
remand, the High Court acquitted Funasako after excluding the confession on bekken
taiho and other grounds and rejecting the reliability of the pubic hair.
Other cases are described in Ishikawa, Bekken taiho-kuryi [Arrest and Con-
finement on a Separate Incident], 74 BESSATSU JURISUTO, KErn SosHGn5 HANREI
HYAKUSEN (DAI-4-HAN) [JURISTo EXTRA NUMBER, 100 SELECTED CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE DECISIONS, 4TH ED.] 26, 28 (1981) [hereinafter BESSATSU JURISUTO].
" In the Kagoshima Couple case described in the preceding note, for example,
the court rejected the other key evidence and also found that Funasako had a valid
alibi.
', See, e.g., cases listed in MATSUO, supra note 77, at 99.
," See, e.g., discussion in Ishikawa, supra note 150.
114 See Okabe, Bekken taiho - bekken karya [Arrest on Separate Incident, Con-
finement on Separate Incident], in JURISUTO ZUKAN, supra note 114, at 64, 65.
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illegal would seem to amount to little more than judicial jawboning,
and subsequently the practice continues to remain a key tool for
investigators.'55
B. Voluntary Accompaniment- "Nin'i DOk'"
In some cases, however, police are unable to come up with probable
cause for an arrest on even a minor crime. In many such cases (and,
one should note, in the vast majority of cases where the police do
have sufficient basis for an arrest on some charge), investigators ask
the suspect to "voluntarily accompany" them for questioning (nin'i
d~ko). Japanese suspects seldom refuse such requests. 56
Most voluntary accompaniments in Japan are undoubtedly just
that-truly voluntary attempts to explain one's actions and avoid the
stigma of an arrest. As interpreted by Japanese courts, however, the
concept of "voluntary accompaniment" is broad enough to allow
police to put considerable pressure on suspects to "consent" to rather
extensive questioning. Accordingly, this approach easily can be abused
to pursue hunches. It is not surprising that many of the problematic
cases in Japan, including several of the death penalty retrial cases,
began with voluntary accompaniments. In the Menda case, 5 7 for
example, the police initially lacked sufficient evidence to arrest the
suspect, but had a hunch that he had committed a murder and asked
him to accompany them "voluntarily" for questioning. Ultimately,
in a ruling some thirty-five years later (thirty-three of which the
suspect had spent on death row), the Kumamoto District Court
concluded that the manner of the request-conveyed by five armed
policemen late one evening-exceeded the bounds of voluntariness.5 8
As is typical of such decisions, however, that court already had
concluded, as a factual matter, that the defendant had a valid alibi
and could not have committed the crime. Thus, the ruling on the
voluntariness issue did not affect the outcome of the case.
Of course, police in the United States also often seek the voluntary
cooperation of suspects. Yet the prevailing Japanese standards for
M See MIYAZAWA, HANZAI S6SA, supra note 73, at 232-34. For a discussion of
bekken taiho by a high court judge, criticizing the practice but describing it as being
used frequently as an "everyday matter," see Ishimatsu, Wagakuni no keiji hikokunin
wa, saibankan ni yoru saiban o hontU ni ukete iru no ka [Are Criminal Defendants
in Japan Truly Receiving Trials by Judges], 423 HUGAKU SEMIN. 62, 65 (1990).
116 See, e.g., BAYLEY, supra note 68, at 146.
"I Judgment of July 15, 1983, Chisai (District Court), 1090 HAhn 21, 85 (Japan
v. Menda, Kumamoto D. Ct.).
158 Id.
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"voluntariness" are quite different from those in the United States.
Given the heavy overlay of constitutional jurisprudence in the area
of criminal procedure in the United States, many Americans might
expect that in Japan, as well, this issue would be resolved on con-
stitutional grounds. After all, Article 38 of the Japanese Constitution
provides that "[c]onfession[s] made under compulsion . . . shall not
be admitted in evidence." The key cases, however, do not turn on
matters of constitutional interpretation; this issue is treated as a matter
of statutory interpretation in Japan.
With respect to voluntary accompaniment, the key debate centers
on Article 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.5 9 That article
provides that "[investigators] may conduct questioning necessary in
order to attain the objectives of the investigation; provided, however,
that compulsory measures (kyasei no shobun) may not be taken except
in situations where there are special provisions in this law. "16°Within
Japanese legal circles there is broad agreement that this provision,
by referring only to "compulsory measures," permits all forms of
voluntary investigations.16'
Academic theories abound regarding the borderline between "com-
pulsion" and "voluntariness."' 162 At one extreme are those who argue
that all actions that infringe upon the legal rights of citizens should
be regarded as compulsory, whether or not the individual has given
his or her consent. 63 At the other extreme is the view that the term
259 Two other key provisions are Article 198 of the Code, supra note 9, and Article
2 of the Performance of Police Duties Act, Law No. 136 of 1948, arts. 2(1) and
2(2). As mentioned earlier, the former provides police and prosecutors with authority
to question suspects with respect to the investigation of crime, but expressly recognizes
the right of suspects to refuse to answer and to leave "if not under arrest," see
supra text accompanying notes 111-15. The latter provides that police may question
individuals reasonably suspected of having committed or being about to commit a
crime or thought to have information about a crime that has been committed, and
further provides that, when it would be to the detriment of the individual or would
impede traffic, the police may request the individual to accompany them to the
police station or police box for questioning. That article makes no mention of the
right to refuse to answer or to refuse to accompany the police. Performance of
Police Duties Act, supra, art. 2.
,60 Code, supra note 9, art. 197(1) (emphasis added).
161 See generally Koroyasu, Nin'i s~sa to jiyU no seigen [Voluntary Investigations
and Restrictions on Freedom], in 5 GEAM KEIEATSUHU TAiKEI, KEui TETSUZUKI I
[5 MODERN PUNIVE LAW SYSTEm, CRIMnAL PROCEDURES PART 1] 135, 137 (K.
Ishihara et al. eds. 1983).
162 See id., at 137-44, for a description of five different theories.
161 See Yoneyama, Hanzai s~sa to shashin satsuei [Criminal Investigations and the
Taking of Photographs], in 7 BESSATSi HANREI TAIMuzu, KEUsOSH(HU No RIRON
To Jrrsumu [HANREI TnMEs SPECIAL EDITION, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE THEORY AND
PRACTICE] 270 (1980).
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"compulsory measures" refers only to measures specifically men-
tioned in the Code (such as arrests, confinement, and searches and
seizures) for which warrants are normally required, and that all other
types of investigation are voluntary and may be carried out entirely
at the discretion of investigators.164 Middle views include one theory
which places primary emphasis on the extent of force and overbearing
of the will of the suspect.1 65 Another suggests that there should be
an intermediate category, referred to as "actual force" (jitsuryoku),
which would be recognized as permissible within limits regarded as
appropriate "from the standpoint of socially accepted views.' 6 Al-
though Japanese courts have never formally adopted this "actual
force" theory, they frequently have referred to "socially accepted
views" (shakaitsanen) in permitting broad activities under the aegis
of "voluntary investigation."
In the leading case on the meaning of "compulsory measures,"
the Supreme Court's Third Petty Bench ruled in 1976 that the use
of physical force does not necessarily constitute compulsion.1 67 The
Court held that a policeman did not undertake a "compulsory meas-
ure" when he grabbed an individual who stood up and tried to leave
a police station two hours after he "voluntarily" accompanied police
to the station following his refusal to take a breath test. The Court
rejected the argument that use of physical force per se constitutes
compulsion, instead setting forth a two-tiered analysis of the meaning
of "compulsory measures." At the first level are true "compulsory
measures" -"measures that it would be inappropriate to permit in
the absence of special authorizing provisions, such as acts that dom-
inate the will of the individual and compulsorily effectuate the ob-
jectives of the investigation by imposing restraints on [the individual's]
person, home, possessions, etc.' ' 68 These are impermissible unless
authorized by statute (and are generally subject to a warrant re-
quirement). The Court regarded other measures-including other uses
16 See, e.g., BESSATSU H6GAKU SEMINA, KIHONHO KONMENTARU, KEJISOSH61H1
[HOGAKU SEMINAR SPECIAL EDITION, BASIC LAW COMMENTARY: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]
160 (T. Takada, ed. 1973).
163 SAIKSSAIBANSHO HANREI KAISETSU, KEIIEN, SH6WA 51-NENDO [COMMENTARY
ON SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS, CRIMINAL VOLUME] 64 (1976) (case comment by
research judge K~jo).
166 Idei, Nin'i, jitsuryoku, kyisei [Voluntariness, Actual Force, Compulsion], 65
JuRisuTo 14 (1954).
167 Judgment of March 16, 1976, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 30 Keishu 187 (Tan-
ahashi v. Japan).
168 Id. at 191, 192.
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of physical force-as so-called "voluntary measures," holding that
their permissibility depends upon a balancing of the need for and
urgency of the measures against the degree of infringement of legal
interests.
In Tanahashi, the Court held that the policeman's actions did not
rise to the level of a true "compulsory measure" which the Court
equated with an arrest. Applying a balancing test, the Court found
that the suspicion of drunk driving and the desire to promptly perform
a breath test provided the need and urgency for restraining the driver
and outweighed the relatively weak restraint employed. The Court
did not describe the circumstances under which the driver agreed to
accompany the police to the station, nor did it mention whether he
ever requested to be allowed to leave the station.
Assuming that he had in fact voluntarily agreed to go to the station
and remain there for questioning, the additional restraint involved
in grabbing him as he sought to leave does not seem very great.
Moreover, given current sensitivity to drunk driving, the conclusion
that the police acted reasonably probably would not strike most
Americans as surprising. Yet, the fact that the driver continually
refused to submit to the breath test and attempted to run out of the
station raises considerable doubt as to just how "voluntary" he
thought his presence was.
Other cases strain the "voluntary"/"compulsory" distinction fur-
ther. For instance, in two decisions involving individuals suspected
of bank robbery, courts found a permissible "voluntary accompa-
niment" even though the police surrounded the suspects, grabbed
them by the shoulders and elbows, and dragged them along. 69
One of the most extreme examples is reflected by the Takanawa
Green Mansion Hostess Murder Case. 70 In that case, the Supreme
Court upheld an investigation in which the so-called "voluntary ac-
companiment" lasted for four and a half days. The suspect was
subjected to intense questioning at a police station from morning
until late each evening, then taken in a police car to a room arranged
by the police, where he was kept under continuous observation until
the police car arrived to take him back to the station the next morning.
19 Judgment of March 29, 1976, Chisai (District Court), 838 HAzrn 99 (Tottori
D. Ct.); Judgment of June 30, 1977, K~sai (High Court), 866 HANJI 180 (Tokyo
High Ct.).
170 Ruling of Feb. 29, 1984, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 38 Keisht 479 (Ikuhara
v. Japan).
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Although the following description of that case is somewhat long, it
reveals much about police and judicial attitudes regarding the bounds
of "voluntariness" and suspects' rights.
As its popular name suggests, the case involved the murder of a
bar hostess in her apartment in the Takanawa Green Mansion con-
dominium complex on May 18, 1977. Two days later, Isamu Ikuhara,
a thirty-three year old hotel employee who previously lived with the
victim, went to the police station in Takanawa (a district of Tokyo)
and gave an alibi. Although the alibi did not check out, the police
could not find sufficient evidence to obtain an arrest warrant. Nev-
ertheless, early on the morning of June 7th, four policemen went to
Ikuhara's room at his company's dormitory and asked him to ac-
company them to the police station in Takanawa as a prime suspect
in the case. He assented, and the four policemen escorted him to
the station in a police car. That morning police administered a
polygraph test. They then questioned him in a small room at the
Takanawa police station until he confessed to the murder at about
ten o'clock that evening. After preparing a confession statement, the
police broke off questioning sometime after 11 p.m.
At that point Ikuhara signed a statement indicating that he wished
to provide a more detailed explanation the next day and wanted the
police to arrange a place for him to spend the night. The police then
put him up in another company's rooming facility. One policeman
occupied the room next door, and three or four more policemen
stayed in the same facility to keep him under observation. The
following morning, police again picked him up in a police car and
took him to the station for questioning, which again lasted until
eleven in the evening. That night they had him stay in a local hotel.
The same pattern continued for two more days and nights, with the
questioning continuing through mid-afternoon on June I Ith. Yet,
despite obtaining several detailed confession statements, the police
still found no corroborating evidence sufficient in their view to arrest
Ikuhara. 171 On June 11th they turned him over to his mother, who
came to the station from her home in another prefecture after she
signed a release form acknowledging that she was taking her son
(who, remember, presumably was at the station of his own free will).
171 Article 38 of the Constitution, supra note 8, and Article 319(2) of the Code,
supra note 9, expressly state that no person may be convicted where the only proof
against him is his own confession. No such formal requirement applies to probable
cause for arrest, though.
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The police continued to search for evidence to confirm Ikuhara's
confession and eventually arrested him two and a half months later.
He asserted another alibi but confessed after three more days of
questioning. Police and prosecutors continued to interrogate him for
another seventeen days before finally indicting him.
Although Ikuhara denied the crime at trial, he was convicted. After
the Tokyo High Court upheld the conviction, Ikuhara appealed to
the Supreme Court, claiming that his original questioning amounted
to an illegal and unconstitutional arrest without a warrant and that
his confession should be excluded. Although the Second Petty Bench
rejected his appeal unanimously, the five Justices split 3-2 on the
legality of the original investigation. As the controlling legal standard,
the majority announced that in order to pass muster as a "voluntary
investigation," the investigation must not rise to the level of "com-
pulsory measures" (as defined in the 1976 drunk driving case discussed
above). Furthermore, "compulsary measures" must be within limits
"regarded as appropriate, based on socially accepted views, in light
of the nature of the case, the degree of suspicion concerning the
suspect, the attitude of the suspect, and other relevant factors.' '172
Applying that standard to the facts of this case, the Court found
nothing inappropriate about the methods and manner of the original
"voluntary accompaniment," noting that there was growing suspicion
about Ikuhara and that, in light of the nature and gravity of the
crime, "the need existed to hear the circumstances and obtain an
explanation directly from the defendant. ' 173 Additionally, the Court
found no signs of "violence, intimidation, or the like that would
affect the voluntariness of the defenaant's statements in the ques-
tioning that followed this voluntary accompaniment."' ' 74
The majority recognized that certain elements of the case suggested
that the defendant felt that he had no choice but to submit to the
long hours of questioning which continued over several days, and
indicated a reluctance to hold that the methods were appropriate for
voluntary questioning. 75 The court noted, however, that
the defendant did submit the request for the first night's lodging
..., and, on the record, there is no indication that defendant refused
172 Ruling of Feb. 29, 1984, Saikdsai (Supreme Court), 38 Keishff at 485 (Ikuhara
v. Japan).
173 Id.
174 Id. (emphasis added).
175 Id. at 486.
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the questioning or lodging during that period, nor that he requested
or sought to leave the interrogation room or lodging facilities. Nor
can we perceive any sign that the investigators compelled the ques-
tioning or refused or detained the defendant from leaving. Based
on the various facts, we conclude that the defendant, of his own
will, accepted both the questioning and the lodging... .[Moreover,]
upon considering the concrete circumstances, including the nature
of the case and the need to obtain detailed facts and explanations
from the defendant promptly, we find that the investigation was
unavoidable from the standpoint of socially accepted views, and did
not exceed the limits of a permissible voluntary investigation. 7 6
Justices Kinoshita and Ohashi sharply disagreed, arguing that,
"under the circumstances, it was extremely difficult for the defendant
to determine his own will freely.' 1 77 They contended that no matter
how grave the crime nor great the suspicion and need for questioning,
the methods employed in this case were extremely inappropriate and
argued that if this investigation were not ruled illegal, investigators
would take the decision as a license to pursue the same methods in
future cases.178 Nevertheless, Justices Kinoshita and Ohashi agreed
with the majority that Ikuhara's conviction was valid. They based
their concurrence on the view that the effects of the illegal investi-
gation had dissipated by the time of his arrest and questioning two
and a half months later and accordingly concluded that his later
confession was admissible.' 79
The Green Mansion Case is undoubtedly an extreme example of
nin'i d~ka and presumably is near the borderline of permissibility.
It is not unique, however. In 1980 the Tokyo District Court reviewed
a similar case in which the police booked a hotel room for a murder
suspect and stayed with him for two nights during the course of a
"voluntary investigation." Interestingly enough, the court concluded
that the investigation rose to the level of an illegal, warrantless
arrest.180
In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court upheld as voluntary
a confession obtained through over twenty-two hours of virtually
continual questioning. The interrogation commenced with a voluntary
176 Id. at 486-87 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 492 (Kinoshita and Ohashi, JJ., separate opinion).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 493.
,90 Judgment of August 13, 1980, Chisai (District Court), 972 HANJI 136 (Tokyo
D. Ct.).
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accompaniment at 11 p.m. and continued until the suspect's arrest
on a robbery murder charge at 9:25 the following evening-a period
during which the suspect was not given the opportunity to sleep.'"'
In this case, the Court followed the standard announced in the Green
Mansion Case, inquiring as to whether the questioning should be
"regarded as appropriate, based on socially accepted views, in light
of the nature of the case, the degree of suspicion concerning the
suspect, the attitude of the suspect, and other relevant factors." The
Court stated that the extended interrogation in this case, which in-
cluded "questioning throughout the night without permitting the
suspect one moment's sleep, followed by yet another half day's
questioning after the suspect started to provide a confession [at about
9:30 in the morning], . . . should not readily be approved, even if
conducted as a voluntary investigation, unless special circumstances
exist."18 2
Nevertheless, the majority found just such special circumstances in
this case. The Court noted that the suspect, who had previously lived
with the dead woman, initially indicated a willingness to do anything
he could to help solve the case. The Court found that the police had
not continued questioning after the initial confession in the morning
in order to obtain sufficient evidence to arrest the suspect or to evade
the time limits before sending the suspect to the prosecutors; rather,
even though they possessed evidence sufficient to arrest the suspect,
they sought to discern the true nature of the crime since they felt
that the suspect was lying about his intent and the course of events.
Finally, the Court noted the absence of any "trace" that the suspect
sought to return home or indicated that he wished to rest, and held:
Given the nature and gravity of the case, together with these other
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the investigation exceeded
permissible bounds, from the standpoint of socially accepted views,
nor that the interrogation was such as to give rise to doubts con-
cerning the voluntariness of the defendant's confession.' As that
Judgment of July 4, 1989, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 43 Keishti 581.
,1 Id. at 585-86.
113 Id. at 586-87. Justice Sakagami dissented from the ruling, noting various issues.
In addition to expressing concern over the length and nature of the questioning, he
noted that the police had begun to treat Miyauchi as a suspect early on, but that
the record did not reveal whether they had ever informed him of his right to remain
silent, and he concluded that the police should have proceeded to obtain an arrest
warrant and should have provided Miyauchi with a chance to rest at an early stage
in the questioning. Id. at 588-89.
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case reveals, rather severe questioning continues to occur under the
rubric of "voluntary accompaniment," and less extreme cases of
nin'i d-Wk abound.
Prosecutors and Justice Ministry officials acknowledge the need to
study the Green Mansion decision and do not want such investigations
to become everyday occurrences. At the same time, some seek to
justify the investigation in that case and suggest the continued need
for such investigations in cases where there is insufficient evidence
to arrest. In the words of one prosecutor:
The real problem is that the number of suspects who give a general
confession during voluntary questioning, and then say that they'll
provide the details the following day after getting their thoughts in
order, is greater than academics imagine. One can say, "If you've
got a confession, then why don't you make an arrest?" But in the
real world there are many timid souls who get very flustered under
questioning, and it's extremely dangerous to make an arrest without
a concrete confession. Yet if you send them home, there is a strong
possibility of suicide, flight, or destruction of evidence. And if we
arrest the person on another charge, it will be criticized as bekken
taiho. 184
This, rather than suggesting an attitude of respect for a suspect's
free will, reflects a belief that nin'i dka and bekken taiho are key
tools for securing confessions when police either are unable to gather
sufficient evidence for a lawful arrest or unwilling to make the effort
to do so. Or, to suggest a less sinister motive, when they desire to
provide the suspect with the opportunity to explain his or her actions
without having to suffer the stigma of an arrest.
IV. USE OF CONFESSIONS AT TRIAL
A. Form of Confession Statements
Article 198(3) of the Code provides that the testimony of a suspect
during interrogation may be recorded in writing in a "confession
statement."' 8 5 After it is compiled, the confession statement is to be
shown or read to the suspect so that the suspect can verify its accuracy.
IS" Kawakami, Nin'i s~sa no genkai [The Limits of Voluntary Investigations], 528
HANREI TAnmuzu 47, 51 (1984) (emphasis added).
"I Code, supra note 9, art. 198(3).
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The suspect may then be asked to sign and seal the document,
although the suspect has no duty to do so.' s
Although the confession statement on occasion is prepared in ques-
tion and answer form, it is by no means a verbatim transcript of
the questioning. To the contrary, the investigators prepare what is
known as a "summarized statement" in which they organize and
summarize the testimony of the suspect.1 7 This summarized statement
may cover one full session or even several days' worth of ques-
tioning.1 8 8 As one former prosecutor recalls:
In major cases I would question for two or three days, taking notes
on the confession in my notebook, and then prepare a statement
covering that two or three days' worth of material. If you don't
do that you can't get an organized statement and you run the risk
of getting a statement that contradicts earlier or later statements of
the same suspect or statements of other suspects.8 9
Moreover, although the statement ordinarily is prepared as soon as
an interrogation session ends, courts have permitted the use of con-
fession statements prepared several days after the end of the ques-
tioning. In at least one case, a court upheld the admissibility of a
confession statement prepared one month after the questioning took
place. '90
Unlike the confession statements in Tokugawa Japan, contemporary
confession statements are not simply "short, stereotyped, largely
abstract ... accounts."' 9' Rather, today's confession statements are
typically lengthy and highly detailed. Yet much like Tokugawa con-
186 Code, supra note 9, art. 198(4). Similar provisions apply with respect to ques-
tioning of witnesses, art. 223, but somewhat stricter requiremens apply to use of
these witness statements at trial, art. 321. See, e.g., Hiratini, Ky~jutsu chsho no
yakuwari [The Role of Records of Statements], in KErn TETSUZUKI GE [CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE] at 879 (M. Mitsui, et. al. eds. 1988) [hereinafter KErn TETSUZUKI GE).
117 At the level of police investigation, this summary is typically prepared by one
of the officers who has participated in the questioning. At the prosecutorial level,
the prosecutor in charge of the questioning typically dictates the statement to a
clerk, who enters it in writing (conversation of author with Haruki Sugiyama, March
15, 1991).
"I Courts have upheld the permissibility of preparing confession statements that
cover several days of questioning. See, e.g., Judgment of May 6, 1954, Ksai (High
Court), 5 T6KY6 KGT6 SAIBANSHO HANKETSUnH3, [KErn] 151 (Japan v Terada).
389 KAwA, supra note 131, at 102.
'9 Judgment of December 6, 1977, K~sai (High Court), unreported case discussed
in Kawakami, Komento I [Comment 1], in KErn TETSUZUKI GE, supra note 186, at
887.
,9, HIRAMATSU, supra note 17, at 807.
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fession statements they are "reconstructed accounts," and defense
counsel and judges have expressed concern that today's confession
statements are sometimes "crafted in a legal manner to correspond
to the necessary elements for a particular crime under the substantive
criminal law" as they were in the Tokugawa era.' 92 Defense counsel
have complained that contemporary investigators "eliminate any as-
pects of the testimony that, to the investigators, might seem to be
useless out-of-place elements," thus generating "closely-knit and log-
ically consistent accounts" which judges may find difficult to resist. 93
Furthermore, judges, prosecutors and defense counsel all agree that
these written confession statements continue to play an extremely
important role in the criminal justice process (although presumably
not so great a role as that of the powerful Tokugawa confession
statements). '9
B. Admissibility
In addition to seeking to limit opportunities to obtain confessions,
the Occupation sought to limit use of out-of-court testimony at trial.
In place of the prewar reliance on dossiers containing written sum-
maries of confessions and of pretrial testimony by witnesses prepared
by the investigators, the Occupation envisioned U.S.-style trials with
direct in-court testimony and only limited use of hearsay. 95 To that
end, the postwar Code of Criminal Procedure contains a broad
hearsay rule prohibiting use of documents as a substitute for in-court
testimony'96 and a series of specific exceptions to that prohibition.' 97
The key exception applicable to confessions is contained in Article
322, which provides that an out-of-court statement of the accused
that is against his or her interests ordinarily may be used at trial. A
proviso to that article prohibits use of such a statement, however,
if "there exists suspicion that the admission was not made volun-
tarily."'' 9 In addition, as mentioned earlier, Article 38 of the Con-
stitution provides that confessions "made under compulsion, torture
192 Id. See, e.g., Tamura, Komento 2 [Comment 21, in KEMr TETSUZUKI GE, supra
note 186, at 890.
'91 Tamura, supra note 192, at 890.
19 E.g., Hiratani, supra note 186, at 880-82; Kawakami, supra note 190, at 889;
Tamura, supra note 192, at 890.
1" 2 SCAP, supra note 60, at 228.
"9 Code, supra note 9, art. 320(1).
"I Id. at arts. 321-28.
198 Id. at art. 322(1).
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or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention shall not be admitted
in evidence."' 99 Article 319 of the Code repeats that language and
also prohibits admission into evidence of confessions "suspected not
to have been made voluntarily." 2°° As a further limit relating to the
reliability of the confession, a court may exclude the confession from
consideration or give it very little evidentiary weight if the court
concludes that a given confession is not reliable.20 1
1. Confessions Obtained after Prolonged Arrest or Detention
As mentioned earlier, courts have excluded confessions in some
bekken taiho cases. In those cases, which remain rare, the courts
based their decision to exclude the evidence upon reference to basic
principles underlying the criminal procedure code, particularly the
use of bekken taiho as a deliberate ploy to evade the warrant re-
quirements. 2 2 One might wonder why confessions obtained following
bekken taiho are not excluded due to prolonged detention of the
suspect, for Article 38(2) of the Constitution and Article 311(1) of
the Code both render confessions made "after prolonged arrest or
detention" inadmissible.
Nevertheless, these provisions as interpreted by the Japanese courts
seldom apply. As reflected by two of the Supreme Court's earliest
decisions interpreting the provisions, time in lawful detention-even
if extended to several months through a series of arrests-normally
will not bring this rule into play. In one of those cases, the Court
rejected a confession obtained after detention of 109 days where the
validity of grounds for the detention were doubtful. 203 In the other
case, however, the Court upheld a confession obtained after detention
of more than six months where the detention was based on valid
reasons.20 Given this precedent, the suggestion that interrogation of
I" Constitution, supra note 8, art. 38(2).
200 Code, supra note 9, art. 319(1).
01 Article 318 of the Code provides, "The probative value of evidence shall be
left to the free discretion of judges." Id. at art. 318.
202 See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
203 Judgment of July 19, 1948, Saikasai (Supreme Court), 2 KeishU 944 (lmai v.
Japan).
20, Judgment of Feb. 6, 1948, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 2 Keisha 17 (Miura v.
Japan). In another leading case, the Supreme Court held that a confession obtained
after unduly long detention will only be rendered inadmissible if it was caused by
that detention. Judgment of June 23, 1948, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 2 KeishU 715
(Kawashima v. Japan). See generally DANDO, supra note 15, at 196-97 and accom-
panying notes; MuRAmKAw, supra note 115, at 26-32.
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twenty-three days following a lawful arrest on a single crime might
bring the "prolonged arrest or detention" limit into play seems
implausible.
2. Voluntariness
Defense counsel frequently contend that a confession is inadmissible
because it was not voluntary. The Code requires the exclusion of any
confession that is "suspected not to have been made voluntarily.' '205
A SCAP official deeply involved in the criminal procedure reform
characterized this provision as "excluding from evidence confessions
... whose voluntary character [is] in any way suspect." 20 6 Further-
more, SCAP's official account of the Occupation proclaimed that
"no confession will be admitted in evidence if there is any possibility
it was not made freely and voluntarily." 2° That provision clearly has
not had such a drastic effect.
As in the issue of "voluntary accompaniment," the key question
regarding this limitation is the definition of "voluntariness." Again,
a precise definition appears impossible. 208 Although the standard for
voluntariness in this context differs somewhat from that in the "vol-
untary accompaniment" situation, there are many parallels. It is clear,
for example, that "voluntariness" as interpreted by the Japanese
courts in this context does not refer to the subjective state of mind
of the suspect. Provided the investigators have satisfied the statutory
standards, any confession that is obtained will almost certainly be
regarded as voluntary. Questions may arise, however, if the inves-
tigators exceed the normal bounds of questioning by, for example,
leaving the suspect handcuffed during interrogation, 2°9 promising non-
205 Code, supra note 9, art. 319(1) (emphasis added).
Appleton, supra note 45, at 424 (emphasis added).
2 SCAP, supra note 60, at 228.
200 See generally, e.g., SHUKOHO TAiKEI II, JIHAKU [SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF Evi-
DENCE, CONFESSIONS] 48-135 (H. Kumagai et. al. eds. 1970); K. MATSUO, KErn
SOSHOHO GE I [CRIUMNAL PROCEDURE, VOL. II A] at 41-43 (1982).
Judgment of Sept. 13, 1963, Saikusai (Supreme Court), 17 Keishti 1703 (Ogura
v. Japan). Even in that case, though, despite stating that keeping the suspect
handcuffed would normally raise doubts as to the voluntariness of the confession,
the Supreme Court upheld the voluntariness of the confession in question, noting
that the questioning had taken place in a "calm atmosphere." Id., see generally
Suzuki, Tejo o kaketa mama no torishirabe to jihaku no nin'isei [Questioning While
Handcuffed and the Voluntariness of a Confession], 74 BESSATSU JUmISUTO, supra
note 150, at 148.
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indictment in return for a confession, 210 or deliberately deceiving the
suspect about the evidence against him. 21' Such cases are rare, how-
ever, and virtually all types of lesser illegality-such as questioning
during illegal detention2 2 or failure to warn of the right to silence213-
have not affected the voluntariness of the confession or its admis-
sibility. Furthermore, as noted earlier, Japanese courts rarely have
excluded confessions where there is substantial evidence against the
defendant and the result of exclusion would be to free a presumably
guilty person. 21 4
3. Reliability
Generally, a confession deemed voluntary will be admissible as
evidence. However, a court still may reject it, or at least heavily
discount it, on reliability grounds. Accordingly, the vast majority of
challenges to confessions include a two-pronged attack on both the
voluntariness and reliability of the confession. Courts tend to place
far more emphasis on the latter, paying much more attention to the
substance of the confession than to the circumstances under which
it was obtained.
Even when a court has serious doubts about the voluntariness of
a confession, it will seldom exclude it on that basis. Instead, the
court typically will engage in a painstaking review of the confession
in an attempt to determine whether it is reliable. It is not uncommon
to find detailed discussions of the contents of confessions even at
the Supreme Court level, 25 and at the lower court level such dis-
210 Judgment of July 1, 1966, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 20 Keishff 537 (Abe v.
Japan). See generally Takesaki, Yakusoku ni yoru jihaku [Confession Pursuant to
Promises], 74 BESSATSU JUISUTO, supra note 150, at 152.
211 Judgment of Nov. 25, 1970, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 24 Keishti 1670 (Okay-
ama v. Japan). See generally Izumiyama, Gikei ni yoru jihaku [Confession Pursuant
to Deception], 74 BESSATSU JURIsUTO, supra note 150, at 152.
212 Judgment of Nov. 25, 1952, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), Keishfi 1245 (Tsukahara
v. Japan).
213 See MuRAKAw, supra note 115, at 5-6 and case cited therein.
214 See supra text accompanying notes 147-51. For an extensive examination of
the manner in which courts have treated a number of issues relating to voluntariness,
written by a district court judge, see Moriya, Torishirabe ni kansuru jijitsu nintei
to jihaku no nin'isei-muzai firei nado no kento o tsjite [The Determination of
Facts Relating to Interrogation and the Voluntariness of Confessions-by Means of
an Examination of Acquittals and Other Cases] (pts. 1-6), 1246 HAhn 13 (1987),
1248 HAhn 11 (1987), 1249 HAhn 10 (1987), 1251 HANn 9 (1987), 1252 HANI 9
(1987), 1254 HANn 19 (1988).
215 For instance, in remanding the Saitakawa case, one of the death penalty retrial
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cussions can run for thousands of words. 216 In carrying out these
inquiries, key concerns include: inconsistencies between the confession
and objective facts, unnatural and/or irrational points in the con-
fession, failure to explain facts clearly revealed by the evidence,
absence of "secrets" known only by the perpetrator, and frequent
shifts in the confession during the course of questioning. 217 In short,
these opinions seem to expect a confession that, if not perfect, at
least answers all the key questions and contains no major inconsis-
tencies.
This tendency to focus on reliability rather than voluntariness may
be seen in all of the death penalty retrial cases-even in the ultimate
decisions acquitting the defendants following the retrials. In one case,
the district court on retrial uncovered various illegalities in connection
with the arrest and investigation. The court found that the defendant,
who was not mentally strong nor in very good health, was interrogated
without sleep for over three full days and questioned at one point
while stripped to his long underwear in an unheated cell. Nevertheless,
the court declined to rule on the voluntariness of the confession,
instead rejecting it for lack of reliability after examining its substance
in great detail. 218 In another case, the district court on retrial ap-
parently accepted the defendant's claims that he was not given enough
food and was subjected to interrogation "without regard to whether
it was day or night," also finding strong indications that he had
cases, the Supreme Court devoted almost nine pages to discussion of the various
inconsistencies in the defendant's confessions, Ruling of Oct. 12, 1976, Saik~sai
(Supreme Court), 30 Keishil 1673, at 1690-98 (Taniguchi v. Japan). On a number
of other recent occasions, the Supreme Court has undertaken extensive review of
the facts and rejected confessions as unreliable in direct appeals (and not just in
retrials). For a discussion of several of those cases, see Hy~tani, Saikin no saika
sai hanketsu ni tsuite-jihaku no shin'y~sei o chashin ni [Regarding Recent Supreme
Court Judgments-Focusing on the Reliability of Confessions] (pts. 1 & 2), S(3SA
KENKYU 1 (Sept. 1984) and SOSA KNrKYU (Oct. 1984).
216 For example, in the judgment acquitting one of the death penalty retrial
defendants, Sakae Menda, on retrial, the discussion of the reliability of the confession
spans thirty-six large pages. See Judgment of July 15, 1983, Chisai (District Court),
1090 HAMhn 21, at 61-98 (Japan v. Menda, Kumamoto D. Ct.). The Saitakawa retrial
decision discussion is twenty-two pages long. See Judgment of March 12, 1984,
Chisai (District Court), 1107 HANn 13, at 17-39 (Japan v. Taniguchi).
217 See, e.g., Usui, supra note 150, (pt. 3), KEISATSUGAKU RONsHU 36:4, at 67-86
(1983), and cases discussed therein; Ono, Jihaku-kensatsu no tachiba kara [Con-
fessions-From the Standpoint of the Prosecution], in KEn TETSUZUKI GE, supra
note 186, at 807, 815-16.
218 Judgment of July 15, 1983, Chisai (District Court), 1090 HANn 21 (Japan v.
Menda, Kumamoto D. Ct.).
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simply said what he thought would please the investigators. The court
rejected claims that the confession was involuntary. The court also
rejected a claim that it had been obtained after unduly long detention,
noting that the detention (which, including time in confinement during
trial for another robbery, extended to almost five months) was pur-
suant to a series of presumably valid arrests on other crimes. The
court chose to reject the confession as unreliable. 2 9 Similarly, the
court in a third case found on retrial numerous problems with the
investigation, including illegal arrest, late night questioning, undue
influence by the defendant's cellmate (who was spying for the police),
and perhaps even "pokes" by investigators and inducement of parts
of the confession. Despite all these concerns, the court upheld the
voluntariness of the confession, in part precisely because the defendant
maintained his denial for so long before finally succumbing. Yet
again, the court rejected the confession for lack of reliability after
carefully reexamining its contents. 220
As these cases reflect, even where the investigation has been harsh
and serious doubts surround the circumstances under which the con-
fession was obtained, Japanese courts traditionally have almost never
rejected confessions as involuntary, choosing to focus on reliability
as the central issue. 22' As one former judge remarked in describing
the decision whether to admit a confession at trial:
Of course, voluntariness will be denied if assault or intimidation
has occurred, but otherwise defining the limits of voluntariness is
very difficult. Moreover, when defense counsel argues against ad-
mission of a confession statement for lack of voluntariness, as a
judge one naturally wants to know what the statement contains.
The prosecutor and defense counsel are fighting over this issue,
both having read the confession statement. The judge alone listens
to the arguments, not knowing what the statement says. In the end,
the desire to admit the confession and judge it after reading it
naturally wins out. 222
219 Judgment of March 12, 1984, Chisai (District Court), 1107 HANn 13 (Japan
v. Taniguchi, Takamatsu D. Ct.).
220 Judgment and Ruling of July 11, 1984, Chisai (District Court), 1127 HANJI 34
(Japan v. Sait6, Sendai D. Ct.).
221 See, e.g., TAMWYA, supra note 51, at 204-07.
2- Mitsui, Gohan to saibankan no sekinin [Mistaken Verdicts and the Responsibility
of Judges], in NION NO ENZAI, supra note 1, at 202, 205. I am told that judges
frequently voice this concern, but technically it would appear to be merely a per-
suasive-sounding excuse. As the immediately preceding discussion indicates, courts
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In sum, instead of promoting the right to silence by restraining
intensive investigations, many judicial decisions seem to assume that
investigators will be able to elicit a full and accurate confession and
appear to demand no less. 223
In the wake of the death penalty retrial cases, each of which seemed
to turn upon confessions obtained subsequent to rather severe ques-
tioning, there has been renewed concern about the voluntariness of
confessions. Not surprisingly, defense counsel and academics have
argued forcefully for closer scrutiny of the conditions under which
confessions are obtained. 4 They have been joined by a number of
judges. 225 In a few recent cases, courts have rejected confession state-
ments on grounds of lack of voluntariness or to remedy police mis-
conduct. 226 In addition, some judges reportedly have begun to examine
claims of involuntariness more carefully and demand a better ac-
routinely address the issue of voluntariness after having heard the contents of the
confession, and Article 192 of the Code expressly permits the court to order disclosure
of potential evidence in determining whether that evidence is admissible. See Code,
supra note 9, art. 192.
223 In this connection, prosecutors often at least appear to believe that many judges
will not be satisfied unless they see a confession. See Zadankai, Enzaijiken o meguru
keiji shiha no kadai [Symposium, Criminal Justice Issues Surrounding the False
Accusation Cases] in NIHON NO ENZAI, supra note 1, at 158, 163 (statement of
former prosecutor Honda) [hereinafter Enzaiyiken Zadankai]; Hyatani, supra note
215, SSA KENKYU (Oct. 1984), at 2; cf. MIYAZAWA, HANZAi SUSA, supra note 73,
at 240 (police believe that prosecutors will not indict unless there is a confession).
This perception is widely shared; cases in which defendants are convicted of major
crimes solely on circumstantial evidence, without a valid confession, are regarded
as exceptional and given special coverage in legal publications. See, e.g., Judgment
of July 3, 1985, Chisai (District Court), 1167 HANI 3 (Japan v. Amano, Tokyo D.
Ct.).
22A See, e.g., Niwayama, Jihaku (Confessions), in KErn TETSUZUKI GE, supra note
186, at 818.
22 See, e.g., Gendai saiban no kadai kaiketsu o mezashite, Zenkoku chihankan
konwakai h~koku (1), GadO hakoku: Jihaku no nin'isei o megur shomondai [Seeking
Solutions to Issues for Today's Trials, Report of the National Gathering of District
Court Judges (1), Joint Report: Various Problems Regarding the Voluntariness of
Confessions], 1310 HANI 5 (1989) [hereinafter Godo- hokoku].
E.g., Judgment of Dec. 16, 1987, Chisai (District Court) 1275 HANI 35 (Tokyo
D. Ct.) (rejecting as involuntary a confession obtained after investigators had lied
about other evidence, but in the context of a case where the court acquitted on the
basis of objective evidence of innocence); Judgment of April 22, 1988, Ksai (High
Court) 680 HANREI TAimuzu [HANTA] 248 (1989, Osaka High Ct.) (denying eviden-
tiary capacity for confession statements resulting from questioning following arrest
pursuant to warrant obtained on the basis of fabricated evidence, albeit not on
voluntariness grounds, but on grounds that the evidence had been illegally obtained).
See generally Moriya, supra note 214.
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counting of the circumstances of questioning from the investigators. 227
These judges remain the exception, however; the predominant practice
is still to admit confession statements quite readily and focus most
attention on the issue of reliability. 228
V. JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE "RIGHT TO SILENCE"
A. Police and Prosecutors
Japanese police and prosecutors generally oppose any restrictions
on their ability to question suspects. From the outset, police and
prosecutors opposed the adoption of the right to silence in Japan,
and they sought its elimination as soon as the Occupation ended.229
Despite their lack of success on the statutory front, in actual practice
they have continued to regard one of their main functions as obtaining
full confessions from all suspects, regardless of any denials or as-
sertions of the right to silence. In the words of one prosecutor,
"[W]ith certain exceptions, such as cases in which the suspect is
caught in the act, it is necessary and indispensable . . . to get the
suspect himself to tell the whole story." ' 0 Most investigators un-
doubtedly share that view; to them, the right to silence at the in-
vestigation stage appears to amount to little more than a legal
inconvenience, the primary practical significance of which lies only
in the fact that they are supposed to notify suspects of the right at
the start of questioning, and in the possibility that even greater
patience and perseverance will be needed to obtain confessions from
suspects who are conscious of that right.
B. Courts
Of course, it is only to be expected that police and prosecutors
might resist the right to silence. Yet over forty years after the adoption
of that right, serious doubts also remain about just how well it has
taken hold among courts and in Japanese society as a whole.
1. Attitudes Toward Interrogation
As reflected by the discussions above concerning interrogation stan-
dards and admissibility of confessions, the expectation that all accused
227 See G-d h~koku, supra note 225, at 11-13.
See, e.g., id., at 16-17.
2" See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
230 Yonezawa, Higisha no torishirabe [Questioning of Suspects], 537 HANTA, 61
(1984) (emphasis added). See, e.g., KAWAI, supra note 131, at 106-7; Abe, supra
note 79, at 67-69; MlYAZAWA, HANZAi S6SA, supra note 73, at 260-61.
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persons should, and will, seek to explain their activities appears to
pervade judicial attitudes toward interrogation of suspects. In this
connection, it bears note that decisions relating to the admission of
confessions and limits on investigations focus almost entirely on
statutory, not constitutional, standards. One reason for this is that
the key constitutional provision relating to confessions, Article 38,
has been incorporated almost word-for-word into Article 319 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (which proceeds even further than the
constitutional provision by prohibiting use of confessions "suspected
not to have been made voluntarily.") 23' Thus, rather than looking
directly to the constitutional standard, Japanese courts instead may
judge the admissibility of confessions as a statutory matter. Never-
theless, to many Americans, certain statutory provisions relating to
interrogation practices-including the very basic scheme allowing
preindictment detention with attendant questioning for up to twenty-
three days, along with more minor provisions such as that specially
permitting arrest for petty crimes only if the suspect refuses to submit
to "voluntary" questioning-might seem to conflict with at least the
spirit of Article 38 of the Constitution. The constitutionality of these
provisions, however, has long been settled.
Furthermore, Japanese courts have tended to interpret those stat-
utory standards in a manner quite favorable to investigators. Perhaps
the most fundamental of these interpretations is the judicial acceptance
of the torishirabe junin gimu-the duty of arrestees and detainees to
submit to questioning-and of continued questioning throughout the
period of detention, no matter how many times the suspect may
assert a desire to remain silent. The same basic attitude is reflected
in the practice of granting warrants rather readily, as long as probable
cause is shown, even in cases where it presumably should be apparent
that the detention period is being used for investigation of some
other crime (the bekken taiho situation) or for questioning to which
the suspect has clearly objected. 232
This attitude also is apparent in judicial views regarding "voluntary
investigations." Although the Japanese Supreme Court has referred
231 Code, supra note 9, art. 319.
232 In this connection, it bears note that courts also have interpreted certain
exceptions to the warrant requirement broadly, for example, by permitting the
warrantless search of a house several hours before the suspect's return as a valid
"search incident to arrest." See, e.g., Judgment of June 7, 1961, Saik~sai (Supreme
Court), 15 Keishl 915 (Japan v. Arima) translated in H. ITOH AND L. BEER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 157 (1978).
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to "the will of the individual" in defining impermissible compulsory
measures, the actual level of force allowed appears considerably
greater than that phrase might suggest. As described earlier, many
of the activities permitted by Japanese courts go far beyond what
almost any American would think of as "voluntary." After all, it
would take someone with a very low level of respect for authority
indeed not to feel compulsion when confronted by several policemen
and asked to take a ride down to the station in the waiting police
car for a few hours-or days-of questioning. 233
Moreover, standards set by the courts directly reflect the belief
that it is natural and expected that the suspect will talk. For example,
in the balancing test used to determine whether a "voluntary inves-
tigation" is permissible, a key factor is "the need for the measures"
in question. As Supreme Court opinions make clear, this primarily
signifies the investigators' "need" to question the suspect. In the
Green Mansion case, for instance, the Court expressly referred to
"the need to obtain detailed facts and explanations from the defendant
promptly" in holding that the four and a half days of questioning
under continual police supervision "did not exceed the limits of a
permissible voluntary investigation." In an analogous situation, the
Supreme Court held that a suspect's continued silence and refusal to
open his bag in response to police requests heightened suspicion and
justified police in opening the bag themselves. 234 Viewed cynically,
one might say that one has the right to silence, but attempts to assert
it will justify the police in taking firmer measures to overcome it.235
2. Attitudes Regarding Testimony at Trial
In a similar vein, judges appear to regard it as normal and expected
for the defendant to testify at trial, although Article 38(1) of the
Constitution and Article 311(1) of the Code guarantee defendants the
right not to do so. Based on the trials I have observed, the presiding
judges normally notify defendants of that right, but you sometimes
have to listen closely. The warning is typically given in a rather
233 Another reason for the courts' willingness to recognize broad use of "voluntary
accompaniment" may be the desire not to force the police into arresting suspects
in cases where there is a chance that the suspects might be able to explain their
actions to the satisfaction of the police, thereby avoiding the stigma of an arrest.
234 Judgment of June 20, 1978, Saikasai (Supreme Court), 32 Keish9 670 (Sakai
v. Japan).
233 See generally Mitsuda, Shimin to keisatsu no deai [The Encounters of Citizens
and the Police], in GENDAI NO KEISATSU, supra note 51, at 84, 86-88, 91-93.
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perfunctory fashion after the prosecutor has presented the indictment,
and is followed immediately by the judge's request for the defendant
to explain his side of the story. Moreover, during the trial it is not
uncommon for the presiding judge to turn to the defendant from
time to time and request his views about a particular piece of evidence
or testimony by a witness. 23 6
This of course represents a great contrast to a typical American
trial, where one of the key points of interest is usually whether the
defendant will take the stand and where the judge takes great care
to avoid any suggestion that the defendant should testify. To some
extent, the difference may reflect the absence of a jury in Japan.
Moreover, the verdict and sentencing phases are merged into the same
proceeding, so evidence of other crimes and other evidence reflecting
on the defendant's character will be admitted into evidence at the
trial in any event. In addition, the Code provides that Japanese
defendants are not subject to prosecution for perjury if they lie on
the stand, in principle ensuring that defendants will not be penalized
for taking the stand. 237
By far the most important reason for the difference in attitudes,
however, is undoubtedly the perception, reported to me by several
Japanese judges, that the only defendants who assert the right to
silence at Japanese trials are political defendants and foreigners. 238
Although 10-150 of defendants may deny at least criminal intent or
some other aspect of the crime (including a smaller percentage who
deny the crime altogether), 239 it is virtually unheard of for a Japanese
defendant simply to assert the right to silence and refuse to take the
stand at all. Moreover, many judges appear to regard the admission
of guilt as an essential part of the psychological catharsis needed to
put the defendant on the road to rehabilitation. 240 Failure to confess
236 Article 311(2) expressly provides that, when the defendant voluntarily testifies,
the presiding judge may request the defendant's testimony at any time with regard
to items for which it is deemed necessary. Code, supra note 9, art. 311(2).
237 See, e.g., Abe, Privilege, supra note 14, at 180-81.
238 Cf. AMEs, supra note 68, at 137 (police have greatest difficulty in obtaining
confessions from foreigners and radicals).
239 See Miyazawa, supra note 10, at 47 (as of 1988, full confessions by 91.901o of
defendants in district court and 89.007o of defendants in petty Court).
2,M See, e.g., Suzuki, G~do h~koku-keiji jihaku jiken no shinri to hanketsu [Joint
Report-Review and Judgment of Criminal Confession Case], in Yori yoki shiha
no jitsugen no tame ni, Zenkoku saibankan konwakai hakoku (1) [For the Realization
of Improved Justice, Report of the National Judges' Conference (1)], 1065 HArNs
3, 18-19 (1983).
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may be seen as a sign that the defendant is beyond redemption. For
this reason, some observers believe that those who refuse to confess
are likely to be given heavier sentences and run a disproportionate
risk of being sentenced to death. 24' In sum, judges appear to believe
that it is natural that suspects and defendants should cooperate in
questioning; judicial precedent reflects that view.
C. The Japanese Public
The level of appreciation of the right to silence appears low among
the Japanese public as a whole, as well. As one former judge has
observed:
Even if you interpreted the proviso to Article 198(1) of the Code
as saying that suspects in custody have no duty to submit to ques-
tioning, as Professor Hirano proposes, the ordinary suspect just
couldn't say, "I don't want to be questioned today, so I'm leaving."
Students and some other highly educated suspects know about the
right to silence and can maintain silence throughout, but other
suspects are easily lured into talking. 242
As the above statement indicates, knowledge of the right to silence
is low among the general Japanese public, and an understanding of
its significance is undoubtedly even lower.
On an anecdotal level, this is reflected in the popular culture of
Japan. In police dramas on Japanese television, for example, inter-
rogation scenes abound, but the right to silence never puts in an
appearance and police are not shown notifying suspects of that right.
And while suspects frequently deny their guilt, it is unheard of for
them to "plead the Fifth" and simply refuse to submit to questioning.
Although such dramas undoubtedly affect common perceptions of
the criminal process, they are merely fiction. Similar attitudes, how-
ever, are displayed in the media's treatment of real cases. When a
suspect is arrested in a highly publicized case, the popular expectation
is that he or she will confess. If the suspect continues to deny the
crime or seeks to remain silent, interest turns to how long it will
take the police and prosecutors to break the suspect down and obtain
a confession. Thus, in a relatively recent case involving quite sen-
2 See, e.g., Enzaijiken Zadankai, supra note 223, at 158, 161 (statement of atty.
Takezawa). Cf. Suzuki, supra note 237, at 10 (defendants less likely to contest points
in prosecutors' account, out of fear that it will look as though they lack remorse).
242 Enzaijiken Zadankai, supra note 223, at 166-67 (statement of former Judge
Yokokawa) (emphasis added).
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sational allegations,243 virtually every commercial television station
ran thorough coverage throughout the twenty-three days of ques-
tioning following the suspect's arrest, and magazines and newspapers
also carried long stories on the investigation. 2" The coverage contained
extensive speculation as to how long it would take the police and
prosecutors to get the suspect to talk. This included descriptions of
typical interrogation rooms and interrogation techniques, interviews
with former prosecutors, and even discussions with psychological
experts regarding the suspect's personality type and the best means
for overcoming his will. 24 In all of this, very little mention was given
to the right to silence, and even that was primarily in the context
that asserting the right to silence was simply another ploy the suspect
might use to try to stall the investigators.2 In the wake of the death
penalty retrial cases and other celebrated cases of mistaken prose-
cution, the popular press contains numerous references to concerns
over human rights, including the right to silence. In new cases of
suspected wrongdoing, however, the press focuses its attention on
243 Kazuyoshi Miura's wife was murdered during a visit to Los Angeles in 1981.
Initially, the Japanese media treated this as another example of violent U.S. society
and was highly sympathetic to Miura. Eventually, though, revelations began to
appear that Miura had taken out a large insurance policy on his wife shortly before
her death and allegedly had had an affair with another woman who had disappeared
after withdrawing a large amount of money, and the media began to carry allegations
that Miura had arranged his own wife's murder. After extensive investigation,
Japanese police eventually arrested both Miura and his girlfriend, Michiko Yazawa,
on September 11, 1985, on the charge that Yazawa had attempted to murder Miura's
wife by attacking her with a hammer in a Los Angeles hotel in a separate incident
a few months prior to her murder, at Miura's urging. Yazawa confessed to the
charges during post-arrest detention. Miura did not assert the right to silence, but
fought both his detention and maintained his denial of the charges throughout the
twenty-three day period. Without ever having himself confessed, Miura was convicted
of that charge, largely on the basis of Yazawa's testimony. See Judgment of Aug.
7, 1987, Chisai (District Court), 1248 HANji 38 (Japan v. Miura, Tokyo D. Ct.).
244 See, e.g., SHUKAN SANKEI (Oct. 10, 1985); SHUKAN BUNSHUN (Oct. 3, 1985);
SHUKAN AsAHI (Oct. 4, 1985).
245 See, e.g., Jihaku shinai "aku no puro" o "watashi nara k5 shite otosu" [This
is the Way I'd Bring Down the "Pro at Evil" Who Won't Confess], SHUKAN SANKEI,
(Oct. 10, 1985), at 28; Miura wa ka yatte otosareru!? [Is This the Way Miura Will
Be Brought Down!?], HFEmON PUNCH, Oct. 14, 1985, at 32; NIKKAN SPOTSU, Oct.
27, 1985, at 14, col. 2; ASAHI SHINBUN, Sept. 17, 1985 (eve. ed.), at 17, col. 1.
246 Although coverage of the Miura interrogation was extreme, similar stories also
appear from time to time when suspects in other well-publicized cases fail to confess
quickly. See, e.g., Pistol satsujin no "Hirota" doba no yakuza mo bibitta reiseisa
[So Cold that even the Yakuza in the Same Cell with Pistol Murderer "Hirota'"
was Terrified], SHUKAN YOMIURI, Sept. 23, 1984, at 20; JikyU shita no ka shinai
no ka [Did He Confess or Didn't He?], SHtTKAN BUNSHUN, Nov. 1, 1984, at 188.
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how the interrogation is going. Under these circumstances, it is prob-
ably not surprising to find little awareness of the right to silence
among the general public.
VI. THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AND THE ROLE OF CONFESSIONS IN
JAPAN
In assessing the extent to which the right to silence has taken hold
in Japan, one should keep in mind that the current Japanese Code
of Criminal Procedure was adopted nearly twenty years before Mir-
anda.247 However, certain Japanese provisions appear to prefigure
that opinion. As described earlier, the Constitution and the Code
clearly recognize a right to silence at the investigation stage. In
addition, the Code requires notification of the right to silence and
the right to an attorney at the time of arrest, provides suspects with
the right to withdraw from questioning at any time, and mandates
that any confession suspected of being involuntary be excluded from
evidence. Nonetheless, regardless of the constitutional and statutory
language, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect that standards that were
even more progressive than those in effect in the United States at
the time would immediately take root in Japan. On their face the
Japanese standards on the right to silence, with their use of a two-
prong voluntariness/reliability test, resemble to some extent the pre-
Miranda standards in the United States.3 Furthermore, the inter-
rogation techniques utilized in Japan bear more than a passing re-
semblance to those advocated by a prominent American scholar, Fred
Inbau. The methods set forth in the investigative handbook described
above249 could have been, and in some cases quite obviously were,
taken almost verbatim from Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogations
and Confessions,250 and Inbau appears to be regarded as something
of a guru by many investigators in Japan. 21
As the standards have been applied, however, the approach followed
in Japan is very different from even pre-Miranda standards. Although
247 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
248 See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 938, 961-
69 (1966). See generally Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions,
65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979).
2'49 SUZUKI, supra note 117.
250 F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (1962).
2I Moreover, Inbau and Reid's book itself appeared in translation in Japan in
1966, entitled JINMON NO GIUTSU TO JRHAKU [INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AND CON-
FESSIONS).
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the United States Supreme Court expressly referred to doubts about
reliability in excluding confessions in certain cases shortly before the
Japanese Code was enacted, 25 2 the key test employed by the U.S.
Court was voluntariness. 2"1 On the whole, voluntariness was construed
much narrower in the United States than in Japan. In many cases
prior to the adoption of Japan's postwar Code of Criminal Procedure,
the United States Supreme Court held confessions involuntary and
impermissible as evidence when obtained after custodial questioning
over a period of several days254 or even several hours on the same
day. 255 Moreover, in several decisions handed down in the same year
in which Japan's Code took effect, the Supreme Court announced
that the failure to warn a suspect of his rights to silence and to
counsel was an important factor in assessing the voluntariness of a
subsequent confession. 256
Although many state courts did not go as far as the Supreme
Court, it seems highly unlikely that confessions obtained after being
questioned intensively while kept virtually incommunicado for a sub-
stantial portion of the statutory twenty-three day period permitted
in Japan would have passed muster as voluntary in the United States
even under standards prevailing before the Miranda decision. Fur-
thermore, when the techniques described by Inbau and Reid were
brought to the attention of a wider audience in the United States, 25 7
that disclosure led to considerable public concern ultimately reflected
in Miranda itself.25 Despite attempts by the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations and others to bring public attention to bear on conditions
of questioning in Japan, 259 no public outcry has resulted. Moreover,
the courts appear well aware of the various techniques utilized by
252 See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240 (1940); Ward v. Texas, 316
U.S. 547, 555 (1942).
253 See, e.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948).
254 See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943) (six days); Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (thirty-six hours); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338
U.S. 62 (1949) (four days); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (three
days).
25 See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 322 U.S. 596 (1948) (confession after five hours).
256 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62
(1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
257 Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau
and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 72 (1963).
258 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966).
259 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 12-13.
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investigators in obtaining confessions, 260 yet in practice condone the
extended questioning and psychological pressure utilized by investi-
gators. At least in these respects, the Occupation's goal of "a fun-
damental change of the criminological attitude" does not appear to
have occurred.261
Simplistically, one might say that the reason for this is that the
right to silence is a foreign concept that is just not suited to Japan.
One could point to the deep historical roots of confessions in Japan
and argue that, despite its central place in both the Constitution and
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the right to silence remains an alien
concept transplanted to Japan by the Occupation and never fully
accepted. This argument, however, proves both too much and too
little. First, the right to silence was not an entirely new and alien
concept. As early as 1916, some local bar associations and legislators
had advocated adoption of a right to silence. 262 Shortly after the right
was adopted, moreover, some members of the profession discussed
it with considerable hope. 263 And for a short period following the
enactment of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, the right to
silence reportedly had considerable impact. In the words of one
prosecutor who served after the new Code was adopted, "[T]he
privilege against self-incrimination [initially] functioned far better than
had been expected by the legislators .... [T]he Japanese people ...
accepted the imperative of the new system at over its face value[;]
... investigators became too humble and timid ... [; and the]
privilege of silence became the favorite weapon of the experienced
criminal." 264 In some respects, therefore, the right to silence may be
seen as an example of a Western influenced reform that flourished
for a brief period of time and then was deemphasized during the
reverse course later in the Occupation. 265 Yet even during the first
- See, e.g., Gado hkoku, supra note 225.
16' Professor B.J. George reached a rather different conclusion in 1968, when he
suggested that the right to silence was well on its way to acceptance in Japan. See
George, supra note 14, at 1166-67. For the reasons set forth above, I believe that,
despite the passage of over twenty more years, a meaningful right to silence has yet
to truly take hold.
212 See ODANAKA, supra note 53, at 350, 366-67.
2 See, e.g., Ogotsura, Jihaku arekore [This and That About Confessions], 6
S-mIHsaK.Ama 4 (1949).
16 Abe, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 623.
26S For a brief overview of debate concerning the reverse course, see Ward, Con-
clusion, in DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN 392, 405-414 (R. Ward and Y. Sakamoto eds.
1987).
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years after the new Code took effect, investigators conducted extended
questioning of suspects, at times utilizing repeated arrests on separate
crimes, and these practices were upheld by the courts. 26 Nevertheless,
it would be overstating to suggest that the right to silence was a new
and alien concept that had no support in Japan. Moreover, the retrial
system, the warrant requirement, and many other aspects of Japanese
criminal procedure that have taken root were in large part imported
from either Europe or the U.S., just like the right to silence. In any
event, the argument that the right to silence is a foreign concept
unsuited to Japan is at most simplistic shorthand. In probing for the
underlying reasons for the current attitudes toward the right to silence,
it is important to consider the role confessions play in Japan.
A. Evidentiary Factors
1. The Search for Truth
It is frequently asserted that the search for truth is the dominant
function of Japan's criminal justice process. 267 When one speaks of
the entire criminal justice process, the search for truth, as important
as it may be, would seem to be only a means of achieving one or
more ultimate goals. In Japan's case, I would suggest maintenance
of order as the ultimate goal. In the context of confessions, though,
the search for truth rationale on its face appears to underlie many
of the attitudes toward the right to silence.
The primary function of confessions in Japan is evidentiary. Certain
aspects of Japan's criminal justice system merit discussion as possible
reasons for the continued emphasis on confessions as an essential
element of proof. First, great weight is placed upon ensuring that
only truly guilty individuals-or, at least, only those who will be
convicted-are indicted. In Tokugawa Japan, it was regarded as a
disgrace if a suspect was acquitted at trial, at least in part because
it was feared that such acquittals would undermine public trust in
the authorities. 268 The sometimes harsh interrogation of suspects and
the demands for sealed confession statements helped ensure against
such occurrences. Whether or not the same concern over public trust
still exists, it continues to be regarded as a disgrace for prosecutors
2" See, e.g., Ogotsura, supra note 263, and cases discussed therein.
267 See, e.g., Matsuo, supra note 149 at 112 (few decisions apply exclusionary rule,
in part because search for truth is dominant in actal practice).
261 See HIRAMATSU, supra note 17, at 831.
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to indict individuals who are subsequently acquitted. 269 The conviction
rate currently hovers at around 99.9%. Moreover, those who have
been indicted and ultimately acquitted are entitled to damages from
the government for the mistaken prosecution, even if the acquittal
comes only on appeal following conviction in the first instance. 270
The police and prosecutors frequently contend that the need for
confessions is much greater in Japan than elsewhere because of the
need to prove subjective intent for most crimes in Japan. 271 On its
face, this contention would seem to overlook the need for proof of
mens rea for most crimes in the United States. Yet the argument
reflects a more fundamental issue: the perceived reluctance of Jap-
anese courts to base a conviction in a contested case solely upon
circumstantial evidence. Japanese judges undoubtedly find that thor-
ough confessions make it easier to achieve certainty in their decisions
and note that confessions obtained soon after the events in question
are fresher (and presumably more accurate) than later testimony. 272
As the discussion earlier in this article reflects, however, this attitude
appears to go beyond a simple preference for confessions; Japanese
courts have come to expect full, detailed confessions. While it may
be an overstatement to say that judges demand such confessions, at
the very least it is clear that many judges are reluctant to convict a
defendant in a contested case without such a confession. 27 This in
turn becomes part of a self-fulfilling cycle in which investigators seem
genuinely convinced that they need to obtain such detailed confessions
if they are to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
That attitude reveals another aspect of the search for truth: the
assumption that it is vitally important not only to make sure that
2" Hirano, supra note 68, at 408-09 ("mass media and the great majority of the
Japanese people" think that prosecutors should only indict "if, through the ques-
tioning, their suspicions have been confirmed fully (jifbun ni) - or even more than
fully (jlunibun no"; "an acquittal at the trial is regarded as a disgrace for the
prosecutors and police").
270 See Constitution, supra note 8, art. 40; Keiji hosh6h6 [Criminal Compensation
Law], Law. No. 1 of 1950.
271 See, e.g., Yonezawa, supra note 230, at 61, 63-64; KAwAi, supra note 131, at
107. Another common assertion is that without intensive questioning it is often
impossible to prove victimless crimes. For a discussion of circumstances in which
confessions are regarded as nearly essential, see TAMIYA, supra note 115, at 306-09.
272 See, e.g., Hiratani, supra note 186, at 880-81.
273 See, e.g., SHIHO KENSHtSHO, NICHIBEI HIKAKU KEIJI SOSHU TETSUZUKI, KENSHU
SUSHO DAI GOJt GO [LEGAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNITED STATES-
JAPAN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RESEARCH SERIES No. 50] 33-36 (1961);
Gido- h~koku, supra note 225, at 5-6.
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the innocent are not convicted, but also that the guilty do not get
away. 274 As the earlier discussion reveals, many investigators seem to
feel that if they are unable to question a given suspect to their
satisfaction under the normal statutory standards, they should be
able to utilize other methods to do so, i.e., voluntary accompaniment
or bekken taiho.271 Judges of course would not explicitly recognize
such a view, but one can find various reflections of that same basic
attitude in numerous judicial decisions, both in such specific language
as in the Supreme Court's reference to the "need to obtain detailed
facts and explanations from the [unarrested suspect] promptly" in
the Green Mansion case276 and in the various standards on questioning
of suspects.
If that is the case, what is the function, if any, of the right to
silence in Japan? It is frequently said by practitioners and scholars,
as well as judges, that the reasons for the right to silence include
insuring against mistakes and protecting the human rights of sus-
pects. 277 From a U.S. perspective, one might suggest at least two
levels to the human rights concerns: abuse (including actual physical
abuse, extreme mental cruelty or the like) and simple intrusion on
one's personal autonomy, 278 which in turn can both be seen as aspects
of the broader notion that the individual has no duty to aid the
government in proving one's own crime. In their writings on the right
to silence, Japanese judges frequently refer to human rights concerns.
Yet as reflected in judicial opinions, the protected human rights in
question primarily fall into the first category-outright physical com-
pulsion, questioning suspects in handcuffs, and the like.279 The notion
274 This does not necessarily mean that the guilty will in fact be prosecuted. Japanese
prosecutors have great discretion in deciding whether or not to indict and, in an
exercise of that discretion, suspend prosecution-in other words, voluntarily decline
to prosecute despite solid evidence of guilt-against some 3501o of suspects in penal
code offenses. See generally, Dando, supra note 59; George, Discretionary Authority
of Public Prosecutors in Japan, 17 LAW IN JAPAN 42 (1984); Goodman, The Exercise
and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan, 1 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 16
(1986).
273 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 184.
276 See supra text accompanying note 176.
277 See, e.g., Ono, supra note 217, at 807, 810-11; Niwayama, Jihaku-bengo no
tachiba kara [Confessions-From the Standpoint of the Defense] IKnn TESSUZUKI
GE, supra note 186, at 818, 822-26 (noting that the two concerns are combined in
yet a third concern, that of deterring illegal activity by investigators).
278 See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 4; Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimi-
nation and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REv. 343, 345-52
(1979) (privilege against self-incrimination constitutes protection of moral autonomy).
279 See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
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of the absence of a duty to aid in uncovering one's own crime is
not apparent. To the contrary, the view that one has a duty to
cooperate with authorities, even in proving one's own crime, appears
to enjoy wide support 280 and seems to be reflected in the various
references in judicial opinions to the need for investigators to obtain
explanations from suspects and in the statutory provisions regarding
the questioning of suspects 281 and even the "opportunity to provide
an explanation. ' 2 2 An apparent consequence is that the rather sub-
stantial intrusion on personal autonomy entailed by the process of
custodial interrogation is defined out of the equation. That level of
intrusion is quite simply not regarded by judicial precedent as an
infringement of one's basic human rights.
Where confessions have been rejected on grounds other than re-
liability, one reason is undoubtedly to deter the conduct in question
by investigators. When one examines more closely the specific types
of confessions that have been excluded, however, it seems more than
mere coincidence that they have almost exclusively involved conduct
of a sort regarded as most likely to give rise to false confessions. In
addition to physical compulsion and questioning of a manacled sus-
pect, 283 such presumably suspect conduct has included promises of
leniency or favors in return for testimony and use of lies about other
evidence.284 One can imagine promises or lies that might inflict mental
suffering; yet the concern in these cases does not seem to be preventing
mental abuse or intrusion on personal autonomy, but rather deterring
conduct that might result in false confessions. In this connection, it
is striking to find that even many of the judges who have recently
been most vocal about the desirability of tighter checks on volun-
tariness and use of confession statements, frame their views largely
in the context of avoiding mistakes. 285 In short, despite references to
the protection of human rights and deterrence of illegal investigations,
280 See, e.g., Hirano, supra note 68, at 411, 415-16 (noting the existence of but
criticizing such attitudes).
28, Code, supra note 9, art. 198.
282 Id., arts. 203 and 204.
23 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. As noted therein, however, the
Supreme Court permitted use of a confession obtained from a suspect who was
questoned while handcuffed, observing that the prosecutors had presented evidence
that the questioning took place in a "calm atmosphere" and that the lower court
had found that the suspect's entire statement was given voluntarily.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 210-11.
28 See, e.g., G~d- hkoku, supra note 225, at 5-6; Ishimatsu, supra note 155,
at 67-68.
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the key concern appears to remain that of reliability, based on an
assumption that the search for truth is the dominant goal.
a. Dangers to the "Search for Truth"
The recent self-reflection by some judges does represent somewhat
of a challenge to another dominant basic assumption that in all but
very rare cases judges can ferret out false confessions by comparing
the confession statement with other evidence.2 6 It is difficult to
evaluate this assumption. After all, the confession statements normally
are very detailed. And, at least in cases where the defendant has
recanted the confession and decided to contest the case, 287 judges
normally consider the evidence carefully. Yet, as the recent articles
by judges reflect, the potential for false confessions is not limited to
the specific types of suspect conduct that have been highlighted by
the courts. In some cases the reliance on confessions may in fact
hamper the search for truth.
Presumably, the main danger of false confessions is not that of
deliberate attempts by investigators to frame an individual. Although
such conduct is surely not unknown in Japan,288 it is unquestionably
rare. Rather, the greater danger is that of unconscious manipulation
of the evidence, for example where investigators acting on limited
2 Under both Article 38(3) of the Constitution, supra note 8, and Article 319(2)
of the Code, supra note 9, there must be at least some corroborating evidence; no
person may be convicted solely on the basis of his or her own confession. The
corroborating evidence may be rather limited, though, particularly if the defendant
does not contest the charges.
It is widely accepted that there is no great concern over use of confession
statements in uncontested cases, see, e.g., Tamura, supra note 192, at 890 (defense
counsel perspective). A leading prosecutor has characterized such use as akin to the
arraignment system in the United States, a form of guilty plea without which the
system would quickly become clogged. Kawakami, supra note 190, at 887-88. Given
the care with which prosecutors screen cases and the need for the court to ascertain
the existence of at least some corroborating evidence, one would assume that the
likelihood of mistaken convictions in uncontested cases is low. Nonetheless, there
is a phenomenon in Japan known as the "substitute criminal" case (migawari hannin),
in which a subordinate will deliberately "take the rap" for his or her superior. This
practice seems to be most common in the context of driving offenses (where fines
are far more likely than prison time), but at times includes major offenses. See,
e.g., Takada, Migawari yazai to saishin seikyi! [Guilty "Stand-ins" and Retrial
Requests], in HIRABA YASHUARA HA.ASE KANREKI SHUKUGA, GENDA NO KEUr HO
GAKU (GE) [COLLECTION OF WORKS DEDICATED TO DR. YAsuHARu HnIABA ON THE
OCCASION OF His SIXTY-FIRST BIRTHDAY, MODERN-DAY CRIMINAL LAW STUDY, VOL.
2] 287 (1977).
28 See JOHNSON, supra note 14, for discussion of such suspicions in a case involving
Communist Party activists.
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circumstantial evidence form a hunch, pick up a suspect of whose
guilt they are convinced, and then lead the suspect to a confession
that fits the existing evidence. In such a case, the investigators may
be so convinced of the suspect's guilt that they regard any denials,
alibis or assertions of inconsistent details as lies. Some observers
have suggested that Japanese suspects are more likely to succumb
to leading questioning and to give false confessions, as a result of
both cultural expectations and a greater deference to authority.
28 9
Whether or not that is the case, one can easily imagine that just
about any suspect cut off from contact with the outside world and
subjected to persistent questioning over a period of many hours,
days or even weeks might say what he or she thought the investigators
wanted to hear or start to believe what is said. This may be especially
true if the matter at issue is not a physical act, but rather a question
of one's state of mind at the time the act was committed. 2
90
Critics note another related concern, asserting that the wide array
of tools for obtaining confessions has fostered a tendency for in-
vestigators to rely too heavily on confessions and as a consequence
to not place sufficient effort into other investigative techniques.
These critics contend that, despite statements by prosecutors that
other evidence should be investigated thoroughly prior to questioning
a suspect, 29' in practice the process often follows much the opposite
course. Investigators assume that they need not place great effort
into the initial investigation of other evidence, since once they pick
up the suspect and begin questioning they will be able to obtain a
confession that will lead them to other relevant evidence. 292 As a
119 E.g., id. at 150-56, and sources cited therein; cf. Aoyagi, Jishu to jihaku
[Turning Oneself in and Confessing], 898 ToKI No HOREI 7 at 7, 10-11 (1975)
(Japanese suspects in virtually every case end their confession by apologizing for
the harm to the victim or for the shame to their parents, and admit to other crimes
that have not yet been discovered).
20 Miyazawa describes one such case in considerable detail, MIYAZAWA, HANZAI
SUSA, supra note 73, at 109-28 (with later information concerning the case, in
MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN, supra note 73 (Case No. 17)).
One may contrast the view set forth in the text above with yet another widely
held view, the view that Japanese "are not at heart suited to testimony in open
court." Kawakami, supra note 190, at 888-89. This point is made most strongly in
connection with use at trial of documents in which investigators have summarized
the testimony of witnesses during the investigation stage, but also reflects the view
that the only way investigators are able to get to the true story is through a period
of private questioning of the individual with no one else present.
9I See supra text accompanying note 120.
292 See, e.g., MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN, supra note 73 (Ch. 15).
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result, suggest the critics, investigators may fail to turn up potentially
exculpatory evidence that a more thorough investigation would have
found.
A separate set of concerns relating to the search for truth arises
from the fact that the confession statement is not a verbatim tran-
script of the suspect's testimony. Rather, as described above, it is
a document prepared by the investigators after a significant period
of questioning, in which the investigators organize and summarize
the suspect's testimony. It seems likely that, either deliberately or
unconsciously, investigators may eliminate aspects of the testimony
that appear to them to be irrelevant, inconsistent or unnatural. 293
The confession statement is acknowledged by the suspect (who has
an opportunity to amend it),294 but by that time the suspect may
have come to believe the account or feel that he or she has no
choice. In any event, it seems unlikely that a suspect would often
challenge omissions. Thus, as defense counsel have alleged, the
prepared confession statement may represent "a closely-knit and
logically consistent account" from which "seemingly useless out-
of-place elements" have been excluded, with an "allure of conven-
ience" that judges unconsciously may find difficult to resist at
times .295
b. Possible Safeguards
On the whole, there is no question that confessions and confession
statements aid in getting a more complete picture of the facts. At
least in the above respects, however, they have the potential for
clouding or even distorting the truth (or for making a cloudy sit-
uation seem clear and logical). It bears note, moreover, that other
tools that might aid in revealing possible distortions have not been
widely utilized.
One such possible tool is the institution of broader requirements
for disclosure of the prosecutor's evidence, either to defense counsel
291 See Gd- h~koku, supra note 225, at 7 (noting great tendency to include in
confession statements only testimony that accords with the views of the investigators);
id. at 21 (statement of Judge I, reporting on one prosecutor's statement that the
prosecutor would never prepare a statement reporting a suspect's initial denial of
involvement in a crime, since "once a 'denial statement' is prepared the suspect will
never confess thereafter").
I" Even if the suspect refuses to acknowledge the document, though, it still may
be introduced if the court concludes that it was prepared "under circumstances of
special reliability," Code, supra note 9, art. 323, item (3).
295 Tamura, supra note 192, at 890.
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or to the court itself. Under the 1922 Code, prosecutors had the
duty of filing a complete chronological record of the case, including
all confession statements and other evidence, with the court at the
time of indictment. 296 This record was also open for inspection and
copying by defense counsel. 297 With the adoption of the adversary
system contained in the new Code, however, this system was dropped,
in part to avoid the possibility of prejudicing the judge before the
trial began.298 Article 299(1) of the current Code requires prosecutors
to disclose to defense counsel in advance of trial evidence that is
to be presented in court, but it does not provide for the disclosure
of other evidence. 299 In solid, uncontested cases this presents no
problem; prosecutors generally disclose evidence voluntarily to de-
fense counsel in such cases. In major cases where the defendant
denies the charges, however, prosecutors frequently refuse to disclose
evidence in their possession. Accordingly, defense counsel complain
that they are unable to see potentially exculpatory materials and,
because the prosecutor's office generally collects all relevant evidence
before filing an indictment, even much of the basic factual evidence
in those cases. 3°°
For many years, the Japanese Supreme Court agreed that pro-
secutors had no duty to disclose any evidence in their files that they
did not intend to present to the court.30 ' Following much criticism, 0 2
the Supreme Court loosened that rule in 1969, but not too far. In
Japan v. Kozura 03, the Osaka District Court had relied on its general
Criminal Procedure Code, Law No. 75 of 1922, art. 44.
I" See generally Nagashima, The Accused and Society: The Administration of
Criminal Justice in Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN 297, at 307-10 (A. von Mehren ed.
1963); Kakinohana, Shako kaiji [Disclosure of Evidence], in JuRISUTO Z6KAN, supra
note 114, at 156.
See Appleton, supra note 45, at 413-14.
I" Code, supra note 9, art. 299(1). Prosecutors also must disclose statements in
their files if a witness' testimony at trial differs from that given during pretrial
questioning by prosecutors. See id., art. 300.
m* See, e.g., Nagashima, supra note 297, at 308; Enzaijiken Zadankai, supra note
223, at 169-70 (statement of attorney Yokokawa); Yoneda, Shak kaiji-bengo no
tachiba kara [Disclosure of Evidence-From the Standpoint of the Defense], in KErn
TETSUZUKI GE, supra note 186, at 515.
10, E.g., Ruling of Dec. 26, 1959, Saik~sai (Supreme Court), 13 Keishti 3372 (Japan
v. Doi).
m See, e.g., Matsuoka, Shako kaiji meirei [Order for the Disclosure of Evidence],
74 BESSATSU JURISUTO, supra note 150, at 122-23 and article described therein. See
generally T. ATSUMI, SOsA NO GENRI [THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION]
340-46 (1979) and materials cited therein.
30- Ruling of April 25, 1969, Saikasai (Supreme Court), 23 Keishfi 248 (Japan v.
Kozura).
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supervisory authority in ordering the prosecutor's office to disclose
statements obtained from four witnesses. The Supreme Court upheld
that disclosure order, but the governing standard it announced con-
tained numerous conditions, some of which are as follows:
When the defense has requested disclosure of certain evidence and
has demonstrated a concrete need, a court, in the exercise of its
due discretion, taking into consideration the nature of the case,
the status of review, the type and contents of the evidence re-
quested, and the time and manner of inspection, may order the
prosecutor to disclose the evidence for inspection by defense coun-
sel, if the court determines that the evidence is especially important
to the defendant's case and that disclosure would not give rise to
the fear of destruction of evidence, intimidation of witnesses, or
other such harms.304
Plainly, obtaining disclosure of evidence in prosecutors' files is no
routine matter.
In some recent cases, including the death penalty retrial cases,
the courts helped obtain disclosure of documents in the possession
of investigators and the disclosed evidence proved helpful in gaining
acquittals.3 5 However, in the absence of any statutory requirement
for discovery and with standards as strict as those set forth by the
Supreme Court, it is rare for a court to order disclosure of documents
formally, although judges may informally urge prosecutors to reveal
certain materials.
Not surprisingly, prosecutors oppose compelled discovery in any
form. 3° The most straightforward reason for such opposition is the
absence of any statutory requirement for compelled discovery. In
addition, in a somewhat ironic twist, one finds that prosecutors
become firm proponents of the adversary system when it comes to
I'l See id. at 250.
305 See Zadankai, Bengonin ga kataru shikei saishin sanjiken muzai kakutei no igi
[Roundtable Discussion, Defense Counsel Discuss the Significance of the Final Ac-
quittals in the Three Death Penalty Retrial Cases], 35:11 JiYUTO SEIGI 50, at 64-
67 (1984); ZOKU-SAISmHN, supra note 1, at 366-70. In one of the cases, the previously
undisclosed evidence helped establish that the defendant had been in a different
place on the night of the killing. In another, the key proof of reliability of the
confession was the defendant's supposedly spontaneous statement that he had killed
the victim with "two thrusts" of a knife to the heart. The file revealed that the
police had received an autopsy report disclosing that detail before the defendant
"admitted" it.
1o See generally Kawakami, Komento 2 [Comment 2], in KErn TETSUZUKI GE,
supra note 186, at 531 (lawyers favor compelled discovery).
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disclosure of evidence. In contrast to their traditional attitude toward
that system when addressing the issue of meetings between suspects
and counsel, prosecutors argue that to compel disclosure of evidence
within their possession would undermine the very principles upon
which the adversary system is based.3 °7 Yet another factor in their
opposition is the concern that such disclosure would enable defen-
dants (and defense counsel) to develop plausible stories that fit the
evidence in the prosecutors' possession-and thereby distort the
search for truth.30 8
This is not the place for an extended discussion of the' discovery
debate.3° 9 If one is concerned over the potential for abuse of dis-
covery by defendants, though, what about ordering disclosure of
prosecutorial records to the court for its in camera inspection? Apart
from other possible objections, such an approach would return to
a system quite similar to that under the prewar Code of Criminal
Procedure-a system that was deliberately abolished by the Occu-
pation;3 10 and I have seen no indications of support for reinstituting
that approach, which presumably would go too far for prosecutors'
tastes and not far enough for defense counsels' likings.
In any event, disclosure of prosecutors' files to either defense
counsel or the courts would not necessarily meet the concern over
the potential for mistakes resulting from the circumstances under
which confessions have been obtained or the manner in which the
confession statements have been prepared; the files might not address
those matters. To that end, judges in some recent cases have required
m See, e.g., id., at 532-34; Nagashima, supra note 297, at 309-10; Fujino, Gohan
mondai to handansha to shite no saibankan [The Problem of Mistaken Verdicts and
the Role of Judges as Arbiters], HOGAKU SEMINA ZOKAN, SOGO TOKUSHU SHIRIZU 27,
GENDAI NO SAIBAN [HOGAKU SEMINAR EXTRA NUMBER, SPECIAL COMPREHENSIVE SERIES
No. 27, PRESENT-DAY TRIALS] at 163, 169 (1984). Given the broad powers of Japanese
prosecutors, it is somewhat ironic to find them decrying the advantage that disclosure
would provide to defense counsel. Cf. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance
of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960) (challenging arguments
that a right of discovery for defense counsel would tip the "balance of advantage"
to the defense).
'o, See, e.g., Horigome, Komento 1 [Comment 1], in KEUT TETSUZUKI GE, supra
note 186, at 527, 529-30.
"9 For a concise introduction to various positions in the debate, see Yoneda, supra
note 300 (defense counsel), Horigome, supra note 308 (Cabinet Legislative Bureau),
and Kawakami, supra note 306 (prosecutor). There are of course a wide range of
options between full disclosure and complete non-disclosure, several of which are
discussed in these pieces.
11o See supra text accompanying note 298.
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prosecutors to provide records indicating the dates of interrogation
sessions and the times at which they started and ended, as well as
certain other information regarding the circumstances of the ques-
tioning (although the use of such court orders remains highly ex-
ceptional in nature)."'
In addition to the possible benefit in guarding against false con-
fessions, requiring disclosure of such records might aid in deterring
extremely lengthy questioning and perhaps certain other questionable
practices in the questioning process. Other recent proposals have
placed even more emphasis on the concern over the circumstances
of questioning. As one example, the defense bar has strongly at-
tacked the use of "substitute confinement" of suspects in police
holding cells, where, critics contend, suspects are more likely to
undergo harsh questioning.1 2 Proposals to restrict the use of holding
cells have met with fierce opposition and are unlikely to prevail,
however.
Another proposal seeks the establishment of a right for defense
counsel to attend questioning." 3 This proposal has an impressive
pedigree: defense counsel have been seeking that right since at least
as early as 1916.114 In light of investigators' strongly held views that
the presence of "outsiders" would make it impossible for them to
conduct effective questioning, however, recognition of such a right
for counsel seems no more likely today than it was then (nor, given
the absence of a right to appointed counsel at the preindictment
stage and the limited number of counsel in Japan, would it provide
protection for more than a small percentage of defendants in any
event).
Yet another proposal advocates the adoption of mechanisms to
afford greater visibility to the circumstances of questioning, in-
cluding tape-recording or even videotaping interrogation sessions.3 "
If adopted, such mechanisms might provide certain safeguards for
the factfinding process, both by permitting scrutiny of the actual
manner of questioning and by ensuring the availability of a verbatim
3 See Moriya, supra note 214, 1248 HANji 11 at 12 (1987).
312 See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 13.
313 See, e.g., Kumamoto, Higisha no torishirabe-bengo no tachiba kara [Ques-
tioning of Suspects-From the Standpoint of the Defense], in 2 KEUO TETSUZuKi
J6 [CRDMNAL PROCEDURE] 187, 194 (M. Mitsui et al. ed., 1988).
314 See ODANAKA, supra note 53, at 350.
3 See, e.g., Shiibashi, Higisha torishirabe [Questioning of Suspects] 61:10 Horrsu
im 16, 17 (1989).
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record of the questioning, rather than simply a prepared summary.
Equally important, such measures would enable the Japanese ju-
diciary and public to make more informed judgments about whether
existing interrogation practices are acceptable as is or should be
more strictly regulated. Such measures would of course present
numerous logistical problems. Moreover, despite the fact that judges
and even some prosecutors have joined defense counsel in discussing
the possibility of moving toward tape-recording of interrogation
sessions,3 1 6 adoption of a firm requirement for tape-recording as a
regular procedure would face considerable opposition from inves-
tigators and appears unlikely.
Thus, for the moment the concrete proposals for reform have
not achieved great success, nor is significant strengthening of pro-
tections for the right to silence itself at all likely. Instead, the most
visible effects of the discovery of the false confessions in death
penalty retrial cases appear to be a recommitment by prosecutors
to conduct thorough investigations. These include even more careful
questioning and a rededication by judges to a more careful review
of the record to ensure against mistakes in the future. For the most
part, however, courts continue to place great trust in prosecutors 7
and to defer to their judgments on a wide range of issues, including
the need for detention, the nature of questioning, and the prepa-
ration of the confession statements. 18 In this sense, rather than a
pure judicial "search for truth," the current criminal justice system
reflects a large measure of deference to the determinations of pro-
secutors, and the primary recent development-the occasional mod-
est use of inquiries into the circumstances of questioning-has done
little to alter that balance.
316 See, e.g., Tamura, supra note 192, at 893 (defense counsel), and Kawakami,
supra note 190, at 887 (prosecutor). See also Moriya, supra note 214, 1249 HANJn
10, at 10-13 (1987) (judge discussing cases in which prosecutors presented audio
tapes as evidence of voluntariness).
317 The same cannot necessarily be said for police. In practice, I have been told,
courts scrutinize confession statements prepared by police more carefully than those
of prosecutors, although the applicable legal standard is the same. See Code, supra
note 9, art. 322. With respect to statements by witnesses, the Criminal Procedure
Code establishes much stricter standards for use of statements prepared by police
than those prepared by prosecutors, contrast, e.g., Code, supra note 9, art. 321,
cl. 1, item 3 with art. 321, cl. 1, item 2.
311 As a reflection of the key role played by prosecutors in the entire criminal
justice process, one long-time criminal judge, shortly before his retirement, argued
that criminal defendants are receiving trials by prosecutors and not by judges.
Ishimatsu, supra note 155, passim.
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2. Proof of Other Crimes
The interests of investigators also appear to underlie a second
important role of interrogations and confessions in Japan: proof of
other crimes. 1 9 Prosecutors frequently assert that without the broad
opportunity to question suspects they will be unable to obtain suf-
ficient evidence to prove the involvement of accomplices. They force-
fully argue that this is especially true-and especially important-for
such crimes as bribery, drug dealing, and crimes of organized crime
groups, where the mastermind typically has insulated himself or herself
carefully so involvement is difficult to prove unless a subordinate
talks. They further assert that, unless intensive questioning is per-
mitted, they will have to revert to such "excesses of the U.S. criminal
justice system" as wiretapping, entrapment, plea bargaining, and
offers of immunity from prosecution.120 A cynic might find some
amusement, though, in recent statements by Ministry of Justice of-
ficials that just such tools may be necessary for Japan to fight drugs
and other crimes.32'
In a similar vein, investigators point to the importance of inter-
rogation in ferreting out other crimes committed by the same suspect,
noting that suspects frequently volunteer confessions to crimes of
which they were not suspected3 22 and that without careful questioning
such crimes might have gone unsolved.3 23 This may well be true, and
one characteristic of questioning in Japan since at least the Tokugawa
era has been an emphasis on determining any other crimes that the
suspect may have committed. 324 This rationale, which focuses exclu-
"I See MIYAZAWA, HANZAI SUSA, supra note 73, at 228-35 (discussing importance
placed on solving crimes other than that for which suspect was originally stopped).
32o See, e.g., Yonezawa, supra note 230, at 63.
321 FAR EASTERN ECON. REv., Mar. 15, 1990, at 12, 13 (official of National Police
Agency's Drug Enforcement Division suggesting that lack of plea-bargaining and
wiretap authority make it difficult to enforce drug laws); Taki, Otori susa [Inves-
tigation by Decoy] 683 HANTA 18 (1989) (Otori sasa is also the term used for
"entrapment" in Japanese).
322 See, e.g., Aoyagi, supra note 289, at 10-11; MIYAZAWA, HANzAI SMSA, supra
note 73, at 230-35. Unless the additional crimes are more serious than the original
crime, confessions to the other crimes normally will result in at most a modest
enhancement in the sentence. Under Article 47 of the Criminal Code, when two or
more crimes punishable by imprisonment for fixed terms have been committed prior
to a final decision on any of the individual crimes, the maximum term that may
be imposed for all of the crimes collectively is one and one-half times the punishment
for the most serious of the crimes. Penal Code, supra note 57, art. 47.
3 See, e.g., SUzUKi, supra note 117, at 64.
32, See HUAMATSU, supra note 17, at 832.
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sively on the interests on the investigators, seems rather at odds with
the right against self-incrimination, however.
B. Confessions and Rehabilitation
The emphasis on eliciting information about other crimes the sus-
pect may have committed is closely tied to another important function
of the confessions process, the rehabilitation of the offender. As
numerous commentators have observed, sincere confessions are re-
garded as playing a key function in reform of the individual and
hence in specific deterrence in Japan.3 25 Prosecutors and judges3 26
share this view; even some of the harshest critics of the current system
of criminal justice recognize these benefits. 32I
For the confession to have that effect, however, it must be more
than a simple, "I did it." Rather, prosecutors desire the suspect to
engage in serious self-reflection, in the process truly accepting re-
sponsibility for his or her acts and recognizing the wrongfulness of
those acts. They suggest, with some reason, that such self-reflection
is an important step in moral reform, and note that a sincere con-
fession and demonstration of remorse (coupled with restitution) also
help to satisfy victims' desires.3 28 To achieve that degree of self-
reflection, though, it is regarded as essential that there be continued
close contact between the investigators and the suspect over a period
of time, in a closed setting without outside intrusions (or observers),
and that the questioning be thorough and probing, thereby revealing
35 See, e.g., Haley, Confession, Repentance and Absolution, in MEDIATION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: VICTIMS, OFFENDERS AND COMMUNITY 195, 199-203 (M. Wright
and B. Galaway eds. (1989); Wagatsuma and Rosett, The Implications of Apology:
Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 L. & Soc. REv. 461, 481-83
(1986).
326 See supra text accompanying note 240.
327 See Hirano, supra note 68, at 415; Ishimatsu, supra note 155, at 67.
321 See Haley, supra note 325, at 200-01, 208; Haley, Victim-Offender Mediation:
Japanese and American Comparisons (to be published by Kluwe Academic Publishers,
in collection of papers from the Advanced Research Workshop on Conflict, Crime
and Reconciliation-The Organization of Welfare Intervention in the Field of Res-
titutive Justice, Il Ciocco, Italy, April 8-12, 1991); Wagatsuma and Rosett, supra
note 325, at 464-65. In Haley's view, the reconciliation between offender and victim
and consequent restoration of the social fabric represents one of the most important
functions of confession and apology in the Japanese setting. I agree with him (and
with Wagatsuma and Rosett) that this is an important aspect of Japan's criminal
justice system; but my conversations with Japanese judges and prosecutors convince
me that they feel confessions play a far more important role in bringing about moral
reform of the offender, with the potential effect on the victim (and 'on community
feelings) a secondary and lesser benefit.
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not only all relevant details of the crime in question but also the
true character of the suspect, including any other wrongdoings he or
she may have committed. Only through such a process, it is argued,
can one achieve the "meeting of the minds" necessary to bring about
true remorse and acceptance of responsibility.329
If the investigators are convinced that the suspect has truly repented
and that there is little likelihood of recidivism (and if other factors
are satisfied), they may opt not to prosecute further.330 In a similar
vein, sincere confessions and remorse may also have considerable
influence on leniency in judges' sentencing decisions. 33' At the trial
stage, however, the close personal contact assumed to be vital to
achieving full confessions and self-reflection is missing. Thus, the
perceived value of confessions in achieving the moral catharsis and
rehabilitation of suspects represents another fundamental assumption
underlying the grant of authority for intensive and extended pretrial
questioning.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the U.S. influence on Japan's criminal justice system and
the superficial similarity in legal provisions on the right to silence,
the right to silence as viewed in Japan is a quite different concept
from that in the United States. In Japan, the right to silence exists
within a framework where the suspect's cooperation historically has
been expected and where confessions continue to play a central role
in the vast majority of cases. Japan's criminal justice system, one
might add, ranks among the best in the world on such measures as
crime rates and clearance rates and has maintained that position while
keeping levels of imprisonment and penalties rather low. Thus, an
evaluation of the manner in which the right to silence has been treated
must consider it in the context of the criminal justice system as a
whole. A thorough exploration of that broad topic is beyond the
scope of this article, but some initial observations are in order.
329 See, e.g., Hirano, supra note 68, at 415.
330 The police may decline to refer the case to the prosecutors or the prosecutors
may opt to "suspend prosecution"- i.e., not indict for policy reasons, despite
finding that the suspect committed the crime in question and concluding that there
is sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. For discussions of these points, see,
e.g., Dando, supra note 59; George, supra note 274; Goodman, supra note 274;
Haley, supra note 325.
31 See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
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Given the Japanese public's apparent willingness to accept intensive
questioning of suspects, at least so long as the investigators maintain
a high degree of accuracy in identifying the suspects subjected to
arrest and questioning (which the public also appears to trust to be
the case), the fundamental approach in Japan is unlikely to change.
Numerous factors of course influence the crime rate in Japan, of
which the role of confessions in assuring identification of and proof
against offenders, and in helping to achieve their rehabilitation and
the satisfaction of victims, is but a small part. Given the impressive
record and relative leniency of Japan's criminal justice system, though,
one bears a strong burden in advocating change toward a model
based on American conceptions of personal autonomy and lower trust
of authority. This hesitancy to advocate sweeping change seems es-
pecially appropriate if what one is offering in return is not the
American ideal of a suspect who is arrested pursuant to a warrant
based on probable cause, declines to answer the questions of inves-
tigators, is promptly provided with an attorney, makes bail, and
returns to his or her family to begin preparation for trial with the
active assistance of an attorney, but rather the more typical suspect
who declines to talk, is unable to make bail and while awaiting trial
remains in jail, where he or she will have very little contact with
overburdened defense counsel or any other outsider.
Looking at the other side of the picture, what significance does
the Japanese experience with the right to silence have for the United
States? In advocating the reversal of Miranda in the United States,
the Meese Justice Department report contended that a number of
benefits would ensue. These purported benefits included enabling the
"government to protect the public" more effectively, enhancing "pub-
lic confidence in the law," and encouraging state-by-state development
of alternatives .332
That report did not refer to the possible role of confessions in
enhancing prospects for rehabilitation of offenders, however. The
omission is not surprising; that role-the potentially cathartic influ-
ence of confessions as one step in the rehabilitation process-has
received relatively little attention in the debate over the right to silence
in the United States. This is not to say that that effect has gone
unnoticed. To the contrary, judges and sentencing bodies presumably
are taking into account just such a factor when they focus on the
332 Report to the Attorney General, supra note 6, at 93-96.
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sincerity of remorse at the post-conviction sentencing phase.33 Yet
the practice of maintaining silence or denial throughout the trial (or
the plea bargaining process), followed by confession only at the end
of the process, would seem to have far less potential for achieving
true self-reflection and reform than the close one-on-one questioning
common in Japan. Moreover, the opportunity to take the stand and
tell one's own side of the story may lead to a greater sense of fairness
in the system even among some defendants; many U.S. defendants
now express frustration that the criminal justice system, which directly
affects their lives, simply goes on around them and never seems to
want to hear what they have to say. 3 4 Thus, had Ed Meese's Justice
Department wished to include Japan as an example in support of
calls for overturning Miranda, it could have buttressed arguments
relating to the similarities in basic legal provisions on the right to
silence and Japan's success in crime control by asserting yet another
range of potential benefits: the role of confessions in the rehabilitation
process (or, if the word "rehabilitation" sounds too "liberal," the
role of confessions in achieving "specific deterrence") and in helping
to satisfy victims.
Yet several factors caution against great reliance on the Japanese
model of the "right to silence." First, the cultural and historical
setting for that right is vastly different in Japan. A mere moment's
reflection on such concepts as the torishirabe junin gimu (duty to
submit to questioning), bekken taiho (arrest on other crime), or
"voluntary accompaniment" should leave no question that attitudes
toward personal autonomy and expectations concerning the suspect's
cooperation with investigators diverge widely from those in the United
"I See Wagatsuma and Rosett, supra note 325, at 464-65; Goodman, supra note
274, at 49 and sources cited therein.
314 This point was brought home to me forcefully by discussions with inmates at
Monroe State Reformatory, Monroe, Washington, in October and November of
1990, when many inmates voiced this feeling quite eloquently.
It is sometimes asserted that Japanese defendants are more willing to talk at trial
because they are not subject to prosecution for perjury relating to their testimony,
see supra text accompanying note 237. Even if the perjury penalty were removed
in the United States, however, many U.S. defendants presumably would still be
reluctant to testify because of the fear that evidence of other crimes or wrongdoing
would be introduced as impeachment evidence. The right for the prosecution to
introduce evidence of other crimes or wrongdoing as impeachment evidence also
exists in Japan; but as a practical matter it does not make much difference to
defendants, since the sentencing phase is not separated from the fact-finding phase
and thus any such evidence can already be introduced at trial, ostensibly for sentencing
purposes.
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States. The operation of the Japanese system, moreover, depends
upon the high level of trust in authority that exists in Japan - another
fundamental difference from the United States.
Furthermore, the heavy reliance on confessions in Japan comes at
a price. Within Japan, the greatest concern has been expressed over
the potential for mistakes arising from false confessions. On balance,
the broad questioning of suspects undoubtedly has been truth-en-
hancing in the great majority of cases. Among critics within Japan,
though, a continual refrain is that the availability of broad tools for
obtaining confessions has reduced the impetus for investigators to
undertake thorough independent investigations of other evidence.
Whether or not that charge is warranted, the death penalty retrial
cases, which turned largely upon the existence of apparently false
confessions obtained from suspects who had been subjected to intense
questioning after being picked up on the basis of rather limited
circumstantial evidence, stand as a stark reminder of the danger of
false confessions.
A final, and in my view greater, concern is the extent of intrusion
on the individual permitted as a routine matter. While Japanese courts
may define terms such as "prolonged detention" and "voluntariness"
so narrowly that very few cases ever rise to the level of constitutional
or statutory violations or "human rights" abuses, the fact remains
that Japanese investigators may-and on a regular basis do-under-
take intensive questioning of suspects, utilizing a variety of psycho-
logical ploys, over an extended period that may last for several days
or even weeks. Moreover, through such tools as "voluntary accom-
paniment" and bekken taiho, the investigators may even undertake
such questioning when they lack probable cause to link the suspect
to the crime they are really pursuing. One may conclude that, in the
overall context of the Japanese criminal justice system, this is an
acceptable price to pay; but one should not operate under the illusion
that the questioning process itself is a model of leniency, nor that
the existence of a "right to silence" in Japan in fact means that
suspects have a meaningful right to refuse to participate in the ques-
tioning process.
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